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Foreword 
This is the report of a research project, “Developing Effective Trustee-Management 
Relations”, undertaken by the Open University Business School (OUBS) between June 
1995 and December 1996.  The project was one of a series of studies of organisational 
governance in the non-profit and public sectors to receive financial support from the 
Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA). 
The research was conducted by a team of four OUBS researchers (Chris Cornforth, Charles 
Edwards, Aude Leonetti and Jill Mordaunt) under the leadership of Chris Cornforth and 
Professor Roland Kaye, who respectively chair the Public Interest and Non-profit 
Management (PIN) and the Management of Knowledge and of Innovation (MKIRU) 
research units at the Open University.  PIN  works in and across sectors to publish research 
and inform teaching relating to the governance and management of public and non-profit 
organisations. One of MKIRU's concerns is   the role which information, in particular 
financial information, plays in the management of organisations. 
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Summary of Findings and Recommendations 
This report presents the results of a research project on the relationship between boards 
and managers in public and non-profit organisations.  The motivations behind this study 
stem from two sources.  First was the growing public concern about the ability of 
governing bodies to carry out their duties effectively.  Secondly, from an academic 
perspective, organisational governance is still very under researched.  There have been 
relatively few in depth empirical studies of what boards do in practice.  The research 
helps to fill that gap. 
Much of the existing literature on boards is prescriptive in nature.  It has been criticised 
for giving an idealised view of boards and not adequately taking into account the many 
demands, constraints and difficult dilemmas board members face in practice.  As a result 
much of the advice has been difficult to put into practice.  The intention of this project 
was to examine in detail how boards actually work in practice.  As a result a case study 
methodology was adopted.  Four cases were examined; a School and a Further Education 
College from the public sector, and an overseas development agency and a local 
voluntary organisation from the voluntary sector.  Data was gathered using interviews 
with board members and the managers they work with, the analysis of board documents 
and minutes, and the observation of board meetings. 
The research aims to contribute to the development of good practice by: developing a 
greater understanding of the roles and relationships of board members and senior 
managers;  identifying how the information and other needs of boards are best met; and 
examining how boards and their members can be developed to carry out their 
responsibilities effectively.  The research’s contribution is necessarily limited by the 
small number of cases upon which it is based.  The issues the research addressed were, 
however, informed and framed by other research studies, and the depth of the research 
across the four cases meant that issues could be exposed more thoroughly. The main 
findings from the research and implications for practice are set out below. These are taken 
from the findings and implications for practice identified in each Section 5,6 and 7 of this 
report, and the recommendations are fleshed out in more detail in the concluding Section 
8. 
Main Findings 
Becoming and developing board members 
• Boards face a tension between choosing board members whoin some way represent or 
reflect the concerns of the communities or stakeholders the organisation works with, 
and  those who have skills and experienceto bring to the organisation. 
• Whatever system of choosing board members is used, there are  often important gaps 
on  boards in terms of people with particular expertise or who can reflect the views of 
important stakeholders.  Co-options and advisers to the board are only occasionally 
used in attempts to fill important gaps and achieve a more balanced board. 
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• In all four cases, irrespective of whether board members  are elected, selected or 
appointed by external stakeholders, extensive use was made of informal networks in 
order to find potential board members.   Whilst these networks facilitate the search for 
competent board members,  the process is not always  open or transparent to 
outsiders, with thedanger that it  can lead to a narrow, closed group of board 
members. 
• Where initial training on the role and responsibilities of being a board member  is 
readily available it  is taken up and valued by many board members.  However, this 
training tends to concentrate on the legal responsibilities of  board members. It does 
little to develop either the skills which board members need in order to make an 
effective contribution, or their understanding of different approaches to governance. 
• Attention to induction, team-building and regular review of board performance  are 
important in developing effective boards.  Senior managers and chairs  have an 
important role in encouraging or discouraging these processes. 
Roles and relationship 
• It is far easier for managers than for boards to exercise real power in non-profit and 
public organisations.  The two principal conditions for there to be a genuine 
partnership in which in power is shared , first, that the board contains competent and 
experienced members, and second, that management welcomes and/or expects boards 
to make an important contribution. 
• Governance  easily drifts into a confused involvement with operational matters.  It 
happens less where boards have clarified their distinctive role, and careful attention is 
paid to structuring board agendas and meetings in order to focus on key issues. 
• There is no correct amount of information for board members to receive, rather a 
permanent tension between receiving too little and too much.  Board members obtain 
valuable information from informal sources and from having access to the 
organisation. 
•  All, even apparently weak, boards perform minimal stewardship and accountability 
roles: as a check and balance on management; as a source of managerial legitimacy; 
as a link to key stakeholders; as an additional and often complementary source of  
knowledge of and commitment to the organisation.  However, both roles tend to be 
undeveloped in terms of the potential contribution which boards could make. 
• Boards find it hard in practice to play the strategic roles they often aspire to, 
particularly in smaller organisations.  This is partly because they lack competence, 
time and information and partly because operational and strategic roles are in practice 
problematic to isolate.  Apparently excessive attention to operational matters does not 
necessarily mean that governance serves no useful purpose.   
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• Most organisations are not clear about the respective roles of board members and 
managers in their organisations and the contribution that boards are expected to make.  
This leads to an under-utilisation of boards by managers.  
Finance 
• In  all four cases  boards  perform two basic functions of financial monitoring openly 
and, essentially, adequately: routine consideration of actual income and expenditure 
against budget; routine considerations of projections of future income and 
expenditure.  
• Boards thereby act as a structure and a discipline for the financial accountability of 
public and non-profit organisations.  This accountability is rooted in a public 
reporting tradition rather than a management accounting one.  Boards’ roles in 
financial monitoring are constrained by this tradition.  The objective of compliance 
with regulations squeezes out the role of monitoring  financial information as a means 
of identifying trends and patterns upon which to act. 
• The existence of an internal audit function can provide an effective way for boards to 
contribute to i) the holding of management to account, ii) continuous improvement  to 
the efficiency and propriety of systems and procedures, and iii) organisations’ 
exposure to practice elsewhere.  Larger organisations appear more able to oversee 
financial procedures than smaller ones, who lack resources, expertise and an 
awareness of what is possible.  
• The key factors in the effectiveness of boards’ contribution to financial issues are i) 
the financial expertise of both board members and the managers who report to them, 
ii) whether the relationship between senior managers and board members allows for 
‘questioning’ as well as ‘explaining’, iii) how involved of board members become in 
the organisation.  Board members who understand the essential cost structure of their 
organisations make more useful contributions.  
• Boards can, but generally do not, make a significant contribution to strategic financial 
management.  Involvement in the budget-setting process is one way in which they can 
contribution:  it enhances  stakeholder participation in raising  strategic questions 
• Boards contribute little to how effective organisationsare in converting  resource 
inputs into performance outcomes.  A financial accounting tradition holds sway over a 
management accounting tradition, resulting in under-use of methods which could help 
boards to assess and develop their  performance: benchmarking, ratio analysis and the 
calculation of added value. 
Main Recommendations 
For boards and senior management 
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(1) Boards need to periodically review how they can try to achieve an 
appropriate mix of skills and experience among members.  Boards should 
compare the roles they play in their organisation, or desire to play, with the 
capacity of existing members to perform them.   Members with financial, and 
particularly management accounting, expertise should be included within the 
portfolio of board member expertise sought .   Recruitment and co-option 
optionswhich go beyond reliance upon informal networks, should be used. 
(2) Boards and senior management need  regularly to review their respective 
roles and the contribution they make to governance.  The roles they choose to 
prioritise may emphasise stewardship, accountability or contribution to 
organisational strategy.  The choice should accord with the values and history of 
the organisation, the expertise of members, the resource constraints they face, and 
the changing demands of the external and regulatory environment. 
(3) Chairs and CEOs need to ensure that board development is continuously 
undertaken.  Development should aim to equip board members to make useful 
interventions in the organisation.  It may include induction, support, team-
building, arrangements for access to the organisation’s operations, and training in 
governance process skills. 
(4) Board members need to clarify what degree of involvement within the 
organisation is appropriate.  Board members need to  establish with senior 
management how they can best be kept abreast of the organisation’s work and 
what types of involvement within the organisation, beyond attendance at 
meetings, are appropriate to their role and to their areas of expertise. 
(5)  Chairs and CEOs need to give a higher priority to the management of the 
governance function.  In particular, they should regularly assess the provision 
and quality of board-level information and the organisation of meeting agendas 
and sub-committee reports.  
(6) Boards should consider establishing a means of regularly reviewing financial 
systems and procedures.  An option for larger organisations is an Audit 
Committee.  If this is not feasible for smaller organisations, alternative and less 
formal means of ensuring that there is an effective internal audit function should 
be developed.  
(7) Organisations should consider making more use of management accounting 
approaches in their governance.  Board members and senior managers should 
use accountancy expertise not only for financial accounting purposes, but for 
developing means of assessing the performance of the organisation against its 
objectives, especially the effectiveness of the organisation’s conversion of 
resource inputs into performance outcomes. 
 General 
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(8) Management accountants and their professional bodies need to be more aware of 
the opportunities for them to play governance roles in public and non-profit 
organisations. Such organisations can benefit significantly from the range of 
experience and expertise which management accountants can add to boards.   
Mangement accountants as board members can  contribute to organisations' 
accountability,  performance assessment, and  measurement of effective use of 
resources. As board members, management accounts can develop their own 
expertise, experience and contribution to the community.  The mutual benefits 
arising from mere accountants serving on these public and non-profit boards can 
also lessen any prejudices which commercial accountants may have of the tasks 
and challenges faced by such organisations and which some in the voluntary or 
public sector may hold about the limited value and perspective of management 
accountants. 
 (9) Accountants and other professionals who serve on or advise the boards of non-
profit organisations need to understand their distinctive context, needs and goals 
and be able to communicate effectively with 'lay' board members if they are to be 
fully effective. 
 Bringing expertise and understanding from the business world can bring new 
insights and disciplines to the governance of non-profit organisations.  However, 
there are also potential dangers.  Viewing non-profit organisations too narrowly in 
business terms can undermine an organisation's social goals and values, and may 
generate damaging conflict.  There can also be a gulf in language and 
understanding between professional and 'lay' members of boards.  Those 
professionals who are able to make the most effective contribution show an 
awareness of the distinctive aspects of non-profit organisations and an ability to 
communicate effectively with non-professionals.  Professional bodies could play 
an important role in developing this awareness and skills among their members.   
In particular, as part of accounting bodies’ communications with members on 
continuing professional education, it may be possible to develop and promote 
training opportunities which explore possibilities of non-profit governance and 
demonstrate how contributions can be effective.10)  The accounting  profession 
has potentially an important role to play in  helping non-profit organisations  
find new ways of assessing their performance.  Traditional accountancy tools 
have limited utility in helping non-profit organisations to assess their 
effectiveness.  The accountancy profession could play a role in introducing 
emerging techniques for performance assessment - such as social auditing and 
bench-marking - to non-profit organisations. Such roles need not replace the valid 
and proper traditions of financial accounting, and which accountants can help 
organisations perform them better.  But they can add a dimension to governance 
which is consistent with some of its nobler aspirations: helping and ensuring that 
organisations deliver more effectively those social benefits for which it was 
established.  
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(11) The accountancy profession can contribute a broadening of the content of 
board development and training programmes.   The accountancy profession, 
government and umbrella bodies  canfoster training and advice for governing 
bodies which goes beyond their statutory duties.  It should also emphasise the 
choices, constraints and dilemmas which board members are likely to face, and  
develop the knowledge and skills they will need to deal with them. It is 
particularly important that accountancy bodies do not follow the example of some 
legal firms in promoting board training which focuses exclusively on the formal 
responsibilities of boards (in this case their financial ones).  Such a focus can 
frighten all board members, lead to excessive attention to the stewardship role and 
not develop the process skills which all govenors need in order to make effective 
governance contributions.  
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(1) Introduction 
1.1 Aims 
During the last two decades there has been  expansion  in the number  and in many cases 
the powers of regulated public and voluntary organisations in the UK.  In part this growth 
has been stimulated by changes in government policy, such as the contracting out of 
public services, the local management of schools and the establishment of NHS trusts.  
These changes have been accompanied by a growing public awareness of the significant 
role that non-profit organisations are playing in public life. 
At the same time, paralleling developments in the private sector, the governance of these 
organisations has come under increased public scrutiny.  Serious questions have been 
raised about the ability of what are often lay boards to effectively supervise senior 
managers, to oversee financial management and to protect the interests of relevant 
stakeholders and the public. 
These concerns have also lead to renewed academic interest in organisational governance 
and a growing literature.  Much of this literature is prescriptive in nature and aimed at 
addressing the perceived shortcomings of governing bodies.  However, it has been 
criticised for oversimplifying the problems, underestimating the conflicting demands and 
pressures that board members face, and presenting solutions which are difficult to 
implement in practice.   There have been relatively few detailed empirical studies of what 
boards do in practice, and one motivation for this research was to help fill that gap. 
A particular focus for the research was to investigate how board members perceived and 
carried out their financial responsibilities, and how this was influenced by the different 
pressures and constraints that they faced.  However, we felt that this could not be properly 
understood in isolation from the other roles and relationships that board members fulfil.  
In particular the research started from the premise that the effectiveness of any board 
would depend crucially on the relationship with senior management. 
Specifically the project set itself four main aims: 
(1) To examine the financial background and expertise of trustees and the challenges 
they face, in particular how they view their financial responsibilities and their 
ability to carry them out effectively. 
(2) To examine the division of responsibilities and the relationship between trustees 
and senior staff, in particular the relationship between the treasurer and senior 
finance officer and between them and the rest of the trustees. 
(3) To identify good practice in how organisations can develop their trustees and 
appropriate board level information systems. 
(4) To examine the relevance of wider debates about corporate governance for the 
role of trustees. 
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Although the remit of the research extended to broad issues of organisational 
accountability and governance/management relationships, three specific outputs pertinent 
to CIMA’s objectives were identified in the project proposal: 
• Developing a greater understanding of the role that management accounting plays in 
the governance of voluntary and non-profit organisations 
• Identifying ways in which trustees and governing bodies may be developed to carry 
out their financial responsibilities more effectively. 
• Promoting good practice and improvement in the management information available 
to trustees.   
1.2 Terminology 
The term ‘governance’ is used in this report to embrace all the functions performed in 
organisations by the members of their governing bodies.  Governing bodies have many 
different names in voluntary and non-profit organisations: management committees, 
boards of trustees or directors, corporations, councils, etc.  These different terms may 
carry different meanings, both symbolically and practically: a ‘management committee’ 
emphasises the power of the committee over the organisation’s operations and any staff it 
employs, whilst a ‘board of trustees’ emphasises the disinterest of those entrusted to 
ensure that the mission and resources of the organisations are safeguarded.  For the 
purposes of this report, we use the general terms ‘board’ and ‘board member’ to cover the 
different titles found in public and non-profit organisations, although when referring to a 
particular case we also use the particular terms used there. 
1.3 Methodology 
The project sought to be innovative in two respects.  First, it sought to compare practices 
in organisations of different types and sizes in both voluntary and public sectors.  Second, 
it sought to move beyond the highly prescriptive models of good practice, which 
dominate the literature on organisational governance to explore in depth what actually 
happens in the practice of governance.  There have been few empirical studies of what 
actually happens in the boardroom, and the study was intended to help fill this gap. 
To meet these aims, it was decided to adopt a case study methodology (Yin, 1989).  Four 
organisations were chosen for study, which would allow comparisons to be made 
concerning variables such as sector, size, and board composition, without sacrificing the 
in-depth character of the case study method.  
The four cases were  
• a local voluntary organisation (LVO), providing services  in the community 
• a small national voluntary organisation (NVO) working in overseas development/aid  
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• a local education authority school.  
• a regional further education college,  
The cases were selected against the following criteria: 
Sector 
 
Voluntary: 
LVO; 
NVO; 
Public: 
School; 
College; 
Remit National: 
NVO; 
Local/regional: 
LVO; 
College; 
School; 
Size 
 
Budget < £1 million: 
School; 
LVO; 
NVO; 
Budget > £1 million: 
College; 
 
How boards ‘chosen’ Mainly selected: 
LVO (by existing board); 
College (by existing board 
according to govt. criteria); 
Elections important: 
School (parents and staff 
elect some governors); 
NVO (organisations’ 
members elect committee); 
 
Previous studies of board behaviour have been criticised for their over reliance upon one 
source of data, usually the perceptions of board members gathered through interviews or 
questionnaires, because of the lack of any independent confirmation of actors’ accounts 
(Peck, 1995).  In order to overcome this weakness, the study drew on three different 
sources - observation of meetings, actors’ accounts and board documents - as follows:  
• structured observations of board and sub-committee meetings.  In each of the four 
cases, two researchers attended at least two full board meetings and at least two 
finance, audit or other relevant sub-board meetings.  These were observed over a 
cycle, i.e.  we attended the full boards which delegated and received items from the 
intervening sub-committees which we observed.  The two researchers logged the 
content, source and level of agenda items, the detail of board-manager interaction, the 
quantity and quality of supporting information, and the nature of board action and 
behaviour. 
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• semi-structured interviews with key participants in both the management and the 
board of the organisations.  In the LVO and the NVO all board members were 
interviewed.  In the School and College, with larger boards, a cross-section of board 
members were interviewed, including the Board Chair and the Chairs of sub-
committees dealing with financial matters.  The managers we chose to interview also 
depended upon the character and size of the organisation, but always included the 
chief executive officer and those managers who reported to the board on financial 
matters.  The interviews were of between one and one and a half hours duration.  
They were tape recorded, transcribed and analysed.  Between 8-10 were conducted in 
each organisation. 
• an analysis of board documentation and information systems.  We collected and 
studied copies of all the papers which board members received before and during the 
meetings we observed, including financial reports.  We looked at formal 
documentation relating to the remit and regulations of particular committees.  To 
check whether the sample of meetings we observed seemed representative, we also 
sought copies of agendas, minutes and, where appropriate, supporting papers relating 
to the previous cycle of meetings.  
1.4 Structure of the report 
The next two sections of the report provide a context for the findings from the study.  
Section 2 maps out some of the most significant social, political and legal changes that 
have affected organisational governance across the private, public and voluntary sectors. 
Section 3 examines different ways of understanding governance drawing on the academic 
literature.  It suggests that these different perspectives are not mutually exclusive.  Whilst 
the perspectives can and do co-exist in organisations, they also generate tensions and 
ambiguities which are central to an understanding of governance. 
Sections 4 to 7 present the empirical findings from the research.  Section 4 introduces the 
four cases and in particular how the governance function is organised in each of them.  
Section 5  reports on the composition of boards: the sort of people who are board 
members in the four cases, how and why they were appointed or elected, what expertise 
they bring their organisations and how this is used and developed by the organisations.  
Section 6 reports on how governance was practised in the four organisations: the reality 
of relationships between board and management, the perceived and actual roles played by 
boards,  the types of contribution which the boards make and their accountability.  
Section 7 reports on the contribution of boards to  organisations' financial management 
under the specific headings of financial monitoring, financial procedures and financial 
management. 
Section 8 concludes the report.  First this draws together some of the main findings from 
each case.  This is done by an assessment of the key questions: do boards make a 
difference?  And if so, in what way?  This is followed by a discussion of the implications 
for improving practice.  A series of recommendations are made for boards, senior 
managers and  others the accountancy profession to consider. 
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(2) The changing context of governance 
Until recently the way organisations are governed has not attracted a great deal of 
attention.  There appears to have been an implicit assumption that what matters in 
organisations is the way they are managed.  Since the mid 1980’s this picture has been 
changing.  Stimulated by public concern over the behaviour and accountability of some 
senior managers there has been a growing interest in how to improve the quality of 
organisational governance, an interest which spans the private, public and voluntary 
sectors.  This section of the report maps out some of the most significant changes and 
developments affecting governance in each of the sectors. 
2.1 The private sector 
Typically in the UK publicly quoted companies have what is called a unitary board,  
which consists of directors who are executives in the company (executive directors), and 
independent or non-executive directors.  (This contrasts with a number of other European 
countries, which have a two tier board system, a supervisory board and below that an 
executive board.) 
A potential weakness of the UK’s system of corporate governance concerns the ability of 
boards to hold senior managers to account when the board may be dominated by these 
executives.  There have been various initiatives to address this and related problems.  As 
early as 1973, the Watkinson report for the CBI recommended the greater use of non-
executive directors, and in 1980 various City institutions, lead by the Bank of England, 
set up the organisation PRO NED to encourage the greater use of non-executive directors 
(Charkam, 1995: 269).  However, perhaps the most significant influence on change has 
been the report of the Cadbury Committee (1992), on the financial aspects of corporate 
governance. 
The Cadbury Committee was established in May 1991 by the joint sponsorship of the 
London Stock Exchange, the Financial Reporting Council and the accountancy 
profession.  It arose because of concern over the low level of confidence in company 
financial reporting and auditing (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995: 846).  In addressing these 
issues the Cadbury Committee probed quite deeply into issues concerning the structure 
and systems of corporate governance.  Going beyond issues of financial audit the 
Committee developed a Code of Best Practice in Corporate Governance.  The Code was 
based on principles of openness, integrity and accountability.  In essence it strengthened 
the position of NEDs, and tried to ensure a balance of power on boards and greater 
accountability of executives, for example through the establishment of internal audit 
committees under the control of NEDs. 
The Cadbury Report was published against a background of growing public concern over 
the ability of boards to kerb the excesses of some senior executives.  A series of corporate 
failures and scandals at companies such as Polly Peck, Guinness, BCCI, and the Maxwell 
affair, where weak corporate governance was perceived to be a contributory factor, kept 
the Cadbury Report in the public eye.  This and the threat of Government legislation if 
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business did not put its own house in order created a climate for change and a willingness 
among many firms to take action.  Research by Stiles and Taylor (1993) showed that 73% 
of the top 100 UK firms were complying with at least 4 out of 6 key elements of the 
Code. 
However, the Cadbury Code has not been without its critics (Morris, 1995).  On the one 
hand it has been criticised by a number of business leaders for putting too much emphasis 
on monitoring and control, and the importance of NEDs.  This echoes a broader argument 
voiced by the Harvard academic Pound (1995) that the debate on governance has focused 
too much on the control of senior executives and not enough on improving the quality of 
top decision-making.  On the other hand Cadbury has been criticised as a voluntary code 
with no clear means of ensuring compliance. 
2.2 The Public Sector 
Much of the public concern about governance of public service organisations stems from 
the widespread structural reforms of the public sector during the 1980’s and 1990’s.  This 
has lead to many public services being removed from the direct control of elected local 
authorities and Government Departments to be run by ‘quangos’ operating under contract 
with central government.  Key reforms include the establishment of independent trusts to 
deliver services in the NHS, the establishment of  Training and Enterprise Councils and 
Local Enterprise Councils, and the removal of Further Education Colleges and the former 
Polytechnics from local authority control.  In an attempt to improve efficiency the 
Government has also sought to introduce greater competition and a range of management 
practices from the private sector.  Common changes include:  separating the purchase of 
services from their provision, replacing elected board members by appointees (often with 
business experience), and making greater use of performance indicators and multiple 
audits. 
The rapid growth in the number of quangos, the variety of their governance arrangements 
and the perceived increase in central government control have lead to concerns about the 
membership and accountability of these public bodies.  Plummer (1994: 1), for example, 
suggests that the governance structures of these bodies ‘were created without clear and 
consistent principles and methods’ leading to what he calls a ‘governance gap’ and ‘deep 
public unease about the legitimacy of many of the quangos’.  Skelcher and Davis (1995), 
in their study of the membership of what they call locally appointed bodies, warn against 
the dangers of creating a new closed professional elite controlling these bodies.  At the 
same time the rise of managerialism in the public sector (Pollitt, 1993) has challenged the 
rather simplistic assumption that it is lay councillors or board members who make policy 
and officers who carry it out. 
Perhaps the most significant attempt to address these and related issues to date is the 
Nolan Committee’s (1996) Second Report on Standards in Public Life, which focused on 
what are called Local Public Spending Bodies, including further and higher education 
bodies, grant-maintained schools, TECs and LECs, and registered housing associations.  
While the report makes detailed recommendations for each of the sectors that it looked at, 
  13 
it also establishes some general principles and recommendations.  It concludes that best 
practice conforms to the seven principles of public life set out in the first Nolan report, 
namely: selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty and 
leadership.  It proposes that where taxpayers money is involved the government or local 
authority must retain responsibility for ensuring the interests of both taxpayers and users 
are safeguarded, and local mechanisms should exist to ensure local influence and 
accountability.  It recommends that various principles of good practice be adopted with 
suitable modifications across the sectors on: appointments, training, openness, codes of 
conduct, conflicts of interest and whistle blowing. 
It is too early to say yet what impact this report will have, although there is  little evidence 
to suggest that the principles and approach adopted by Nolan  will be contested. 
2.3 The Voluntary Sector 
During the 1980’s the size and importance of the voluntary and non-profit sector 
increased dramatically.  This was partly due to changes in Government policy, 
particularly the contracting out of public services.  For example, housing associations 
rather than local authorities were used as the main vehicle to provide social housing and 
many social services were contracted out to private or non-profit organizations.  These 
increasing demands on the sector and a recognition of its growing importance led to a 
concern to improve the standards of management and governance.  Again this concern 
was heightened by a few well publicised problems and failures.  By the late 1980’s the 
possibility of abuse was recognised, and the efficiency scrutiny of the supervision of 
charities, conducted by Sir Philip Woodfield in 1988, called for action to remedy the 
situation (Holden, 1996: 31) 
In England and Wales the Government responded to these concerns by introducing the 
new Charities Act in 1992 and 1993, which tightened the regulatory regime for charities.  
In addition the Charity Commission, the main body overseeing charities, was revitalised 
and began to take a more active supervisory role.  As part of this work it devoted effort to 
trying to improve standards of trusteeship by directing greater attention to the role and 
responsibilities of trustees.  In 1991 the Charity Commission and the National Council for 
Voluntary Organizations (NCVO) established a Working Party on Trustee Training, 
which produced the report ‘On Trust’ (NCVO, 1992), the aim being to improve the 
quality of governance among charities and other voluntary organizations.  A survey for 
the Report came up with the rather startling evidence that only 1 in 3 of those trustees 
surveyed knew that they were trustees.  The report made a number of recommendations 
aimed at trustees, voluntary organisations, support organisations, the Charity Commission 
, funders and Government.  The thrust of these was to provide more advice and training 
for trustees.   An important recommendation to be implemented was the establishment of 
a Trustees Services Unit at the NCVO in 1993, with the brief to maintain a strategic role 
in developing advice support and training services for trustees.  It was also tasked to 
produce a comprehensive handbook for trustees (Kirkland, 1994).  
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Housing is  an area of charitable activity where issues of governance have received  
greatest attention.  The 1988 Housing Act exposed housing associations to greater 
competition and to commercial risk taking.  This lead to concerns about the ability of 
housing associations and their boards to operate effectively in the new environment 
(Holden, 1996: 32).  In response the National Federation of Housing Associations 
(NFHA) set up an independent inquiry, under Sir David Hancock, into the corporate and 
financial governance of housing associations in England, which published its report in 
1995.  The report (NFHA, 1995) included a draft Code of Governance, which was latter 
accepted by the housing association movement.  The Code sets out guidance on a range of 
issues including: the constitution, function and operation of the board; the responsibilities 
of the chair and chief executive; the role of members and tenant involvement; openness; 
audit and probity.  The report and the code were guided by four key principles, namely 
that Associations should be competent, accountable, independent and diverse. 
Most recently the Commission on the Future of the Voluntary Sector looked at 
governance as one of many important issues confronting the sector (NCVO, 1996).  It 
recommends that voluntary organisations should clearly define the respective roles of 
chair, board members, chief executive and staff; ensure that boards have an appropriate 
balance of members; do not become too large; and have adequate recruitment and 
induction procedures.  The report also commends the codes of practice developed by the 
Nolan Committee, and suggests they could be used more widely in the voluntary sector. 
2.4 Emerging issues 
Historically the traditions of governance in private, public and voluntary organisations are 
quite different.  However, with the government reforms of the public sector, and the 
growing introduction of management practices derived from business into the public and 
voluntary sectors, the boundaries between the sectors has become increasingly blurred.  
This has been true at the level of governance where ideas and practices have been 
transferred between sectors.  Increasingly it is relevant to ask what are the similarities and 
differences between governance in different sectors, and what lessons is it possible to 
learn which may have relevance across sectors. 
Much of the attention and interest in governance in all three sectors has focused on what 
we may call the stewardship role of boards - the ability to hold management to account 
and to see that the resources of the organisation are used properly.  The main response to 
these concerns has been to try to improve  self-regulation through the development of 
voluntary codes of practice.  This raises two important questions.  First, has the attention 
on the stewardship role of boards meant that other important roles are in danger of being 
neglected, in particular the ability of boards to addvalue to decisions concerning the 
organisations policy and strategy?  Secondly, is voluntary self-regulation effective or is 
tighter external regulation required? 
Another common issue concerns the accountability of boards themselves.  In the private 
sector there has been a concern the board members are too removed from shareholders 
and may not adequately represent their interests or be accountable to them.  In the public 
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sector the removal of many public bodies from local authority control and the move to 
more corporate style boards has raised alarms about the ability of boards to represent or 
be accountable to the local communities they serve,  their users, or other legitimate 
stakeholders.  
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(3) Making sense of governance: perspectives and models 
The growth of public interest and debate on governance has also stimulated a growing 
literature.  Much of the literature is prescriptive in nature.  It starts out from perceived 
problems of governance and suggests what can be done to overcome these problems. 
Much of this advice is broad ranging and comprehensive.  It offers what appears to be an 
idealised, or heroic account, of  what Boards should be able to do and achieve, and fails 
to adequately recognise the limited time and expertise that board members may be able to 
bring to their work, or their different motivations and interests ( Herman, 1989; 
Cornforth, 1995). 
Literature based on empirical studies and observations of what boards actually do in 
practice is much rarer.  As Pettigrew and McNulty (1995) have observed, this is still very 
much a neglected area of management research.  However, the findings to date from 
empirical research are very much at odds with the prescriptive accounts, highlighting 
some of the difficulties and constraints board members face and suggesting a more 
limited, and human account, of what is possible (see for example Middleton, 1987; 
Herman and Van Til, 1989; Peck, 1995). 
This chapter which presents a model for understanding governance which was used to 
guide the research and helps to explain some of the different problems and tensions that 
governing bodies face.  The model is based on two key ideas.  The first is that there are 
different traditions or ways of thinking about governance that are deeply embedded in 
society - what we will call a stewardship or agency model, a managerial model and a 
political model.  The second important idea is contingency.  How boards are structured 
and behave will be influenced by the circumstances they face, for example the size of the 
organisation, its history and culture and the regulatory regime that it faces.  Of particular 
importance is the influence of the state, which will be examined in more detail below. 
These different ways of thinking about governance and the wider contextual influences 
lead to contradictory tensions or pressures on boards, which are outlined in the last part of 
the chapter.  Our contention is that effective boards will need to find appropriate ways of 
managing these tensions dependent on their circumstances, rather than be pulled to one 
extreme or another. 
3.1 Three perspectives on governance 
A market perspective on governance - the agency or stewardship model 
In a market-oriented view of society, individuals are assumed to be rational and 
instrumental, and the exchanges that individuals engage in are seen as the primary 
influence on social arrangements.  This view of society permeates much political thinking 
on the right.  These assumptions also underlie much economic theory and related 
theorising about organisations, such as institutional economics, public choice, rational 
actor models, and agency theory. 
  17 
Agency theory is of particular relevance as it directly addresses the issue of governance.  
According to agency theory the owners of any enterprise face a problem, because 
managers (their agents) are likely to act in their own self-interests, rather than the owners’ 
interests.  From this perspective the main function of the board is to control the behaviour 
of managers.  This suggests that directors of companies should be independent of 
management, and their primary role is one of stewardship - to make sure the resources of 
the organisation are safeguarded and to monitor and, if necessary, control  the behaviour 
of managers. 
As we saw in the previous chapter, this view of governance has been reinforced by recent 
public scandals, such as the collapse of BCCI and Robert Maxwell’s use of pension fund 
money, and concern over senior management pay, particularly in the privatised utilities.  
Both the Cadbury Committee  (1992) and the Greenbury Committee (1995) on directors’ 
remuneration produced codes of practice which essentially reinforce the power of non-
executive directors to carry out their stewardship role in order to safeguard the interests of 
shareholders and the public. 
In many ways the principles and regulations concerning charitable trusts, which affect 
many voluntary organisations, embody similar ideas on the role of governance.  Under 
trust law the trustees of an organisation are appointed to look after the money and 
resources donated by an individual or group and to see that their wishes, as set out in the 
trust deed, are carried out.  It is enshrined in trust law that the trustees themselves can not 
benefit financially from the trust, and so employees of a trust cannot normally be trustees.  
Hence the principal role of the trustees of a voluntary organisation is to see that the staff 
or management of the organisation carry out the objectives of the trust.  As there is a 
complete separation of the board members from staff or management, it could be argued 
that trust law is even more in line with a stewardship model of governance than company 
law. 
In the context of voluntary and non-profit organisations Harris (1994) has called this 
stewardship model of governance the ‘traditional model’.  She calls it traditional because 
it reflects the legal and constitutional status of many voluntary and non-profit agencies’; it 
appears to underpin much of the prescriptive literature on non-profit governance and it 
mirrors the historical form that many early charitable organisations took. 
A managerial perspective - a partnership model 
A governing body or board of directors can be regarded as the apex of a management 
hierarchy.  It is not surprising in this context that ideas and practices from management 
should be applied to governance, for example: that board members should be selected on 
the basis of their expertise and contacts so that they are in a position to add value to the 
organisation’s decisions rather than just select, monitor and control management; that 
boards, like mangers, will require careful induction and training; that they will need to 
know how to operate effectively as a team.  Ideas such as these are common in much of 
the prescriptive literature on non-profit boards,  (see for example Kirkland (1994)). 
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The managerial perspective is also evident in various newer models of governance that 
have been put forward.  For example, Pound (1995) suggests what he calls the ‘governed 
corporation model’ of governance.  In this model the board, and major shareholders, are 
seen as a partners of management, and the prime function of the board is to add value to 
the organisation by improving its top decision-making.  In order to carry out this role 
Pound recommends five changes from the stewardship model of governance:  board 
members should be selected for their expertise; boards should focus on new strategies and 
policies, not just reviewing past performance;  directors should be given better access to 
company information; board members should devote a substantial proportion of their 
time to governance; they should be rewarded appropriately. 
A democratic perspective - a political model 
Democracy is a central institution in Western societies.  Key ideas and practices include: 
open elections on the basis of one person one vote; pluralism i.e.  that representatives will 
represent different interests; accountability to the electorate; the separation of elected 
members, who make policy, from the executive, who implement policy decisions.  
Democratic ideas and practices have influenced thinking about the governance of 
organisations, particularly public and voluntary organisations.  For example many 
voluntary and non-profit organisations are established as membership associations, where 
it is enshrined in the organisation’s constitution that the governing body should be elected 
by and represent the membership in some way.  The constitution of many organisations 
also allows that some other stakeholders, such as funders or users, may be represented on 
the board. 
A democratic perspective on governance suggests that the role of the board is to represent 
the interests of one or more stakeholder groups in the organisation.  This leads to a 
political model of the role of boards; a means of expressing, resolving or choosing 
between the interests of different stakeholders and setting the overall policy of the 
organisation, which can then be implemented by staff.  Central to this view is that anyone 
can put themselves forward for election as a board member.  Expertise is not a central 
requirement, as it is in the managerial perspective. 
3.2 The influence of the State 
The State has a variety of important influences on the governance of voluntary 
organisations through legislation and regulation,for example through the laws governing 
the different legal forms they may take, and the work of regulatory bodies such as the 
Charity Commission, the Registrar of Friendly Societies or Companies House.  
Nevertheless the influence of the State is essentially indirect. 
However, there are a growing number of non-profit organisations which are part of the 
public sector but have some degree of self-governing status and policy-making authority, 
such as schools, hospital trusts, and colleges  (Skelcher and Davis, 1995).  These state-
mandated public bodies all have governing boards with some degree of independence, but 
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are subject to much more influence from the State than other independent voluntary 
organisations. 
As Skelcher and Davis (1995: 3-8) note there is a good deal of variety concerning how 
the boards of these bodies are appointed and structured.  However, since the mid 1980’s 
there has been a discernible trend away from a political model of governance towards a 
private sector model of  corporate governance, which has been brought about by changes 
in Government policy.  This has manifested itself in three main ways.  The first has been 
increasing government control over who is appointed to these boards, and a move way 
from locally elected members or nominations by local government, to a system of 
appointments either directly by Ministers or according to central government guidelines.  
In many cases these guidelines have favoured the appointment of people with business 
experience and skills.  A second has been to allow senior managers to be board members, 
so blurring the distinction in the political model of governance between elected members 
and officers.  For example executives hold five out of the eleven places on the boards of 
District Health Authorities.  A third has been to establish many of the bodies as 
companies or corporations where the legal duty of board members is to further the 
interests of the organisation, rather than represent particular groups and interests. 
Overall, the influence of government policy has been to reinforce the stewardship and 
managerial roles of governance and play down the political or representational role of 
governing bodies of public organisations. 
3.3 Towards a synthesis:  governance as paradox 
In practice, the three models of governance described above do not exist in pure form.  
They are better thought of as ideal types.  In reality most boards draw on different aspects 
of these models, and experience contradictory pressures or tensions.  As a result 
governance is perhaps better seen as paradoxical, where the behaviour of boards can be 
seen as arising from the contradictions between the three different perspectives on 
governance.  (This model of governance is similar to that put forward by Wood (1996: 5-
7), except that she sees the paradoxes arising from contradictions embedded in the law, 
rather than different from different perspectives and practices embedded in society.)  
Some of the common contradictions and tensions that boards experience as a result are set 
out below. 
The tension between lay representative and professional board member 
The political  model (and to some extent the stewardship model) of governance stress that 
board members are lay representatives.  In contrast the managerial model stresses that 
board members should have expertise and experience which can add value to the 
performance of the organisation. 
This can raise an obvious tensions for non-profit boards - should members be chosen, or 
encouraged to stand for election, because of their expertise or because they represent 
some stakeholder group?  It also raises dilemmas for board members.  Are they expected 
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to represent particular stakeholders or to give expert guidance?  The professional role also 
demands a close involvement with the organisation.  This may conflict with board 
members’ unpaid status in most non-profit organisations. 
The tension between the stewardship and strategic roles 
Related to the previous dilemma, the different models of governance put different 
emphasise on whether the main function of the board is to be a careful steward of the 
organisation’s resources or  to develop strategy and policy.  The stewardship role 
demands careful monitoring and scrutiny of the organisations past performance and is risk 
averse.  The strategy role demands forward vision, an understanding of the organisation 
and its environment and perhaps a greater willingness to take risks.  Again, boards face an 
obvious tension concerning how much attention they should pay to these contrasting 
roles. 
The tension between controlling and partnering management 
The stewardship and political models stress the importance of the board monitoring and 
controlling the work of managers (the executive).  In contrast in the managerial model 
stresses the role of the board as a partner to management, improving top management 
decision-making. 
The need to both control senior management and be their support and partner in decision 
making can be a source of role conflict and tension for board members. .  To what extent 
should board members push the interests of particular stakeholders if this is against the 
wishes of management?  This tension is vividly illustrated by the following comment on 
an European Union report on parent participation in education by the convenor of the 
Scottish Parent Teacher Council: 
‘Quite often the parents on school boards cease to take parental point of view and 
start to identify more with management...in some cases you can see parents on 
boards closing ranks around the head teacher rather than lobbying on behalf of 
parents’ 
      (From the Scotsman, Page 6, 27/12/95) 
Multiple or ambiguous accountability 
There may be tension concerning to whom board members are accountable.  The agency 
perspective suggests that board members are accountable to the owners of the 
organisation.  The political perspective suggests that there may be other stakeholders who 
have a legitimate interest in what the organisation does, and should in some way be able 
to hold it to account.  For example, board members may feel accountable to those who 
elect or appoint them, to the organisation’s beneficiaries or users, to other board members 
and to staff.  Board members may experience tension because they feel accountable to 
more than one group, or because they are unclear or differ over who they are accountable 
to.   
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(4) The Four Cases 
This section presents an overview of the four organisations which were selected for study.  
As each organisation operated within a different regulatory environment, provided 
different services and had different governance structures, the section summaries key 
characteristics of each organisation which are relevant to the report’s later consideration 
of their governance. 
4.1 The school 
 Regulatory environment 
There is a statutory requirement for publicly maintained UK schools to have governing 
bodies.  Regulations which specify what they must, should and may do are prescribed by 
the Department for Education and Employment (see, for example DfEE 1996).  In 
addition the DfEE publishes guidance on good governance produced in consultation with 
head teachers’ and governors’ associations (DfEE 1996a).  This addresses issues such as 
accountability, relationships between the head-teacher and governors, conduct of 
meetings, and what information governing bodies receive. 
 Characteristics 
The school was an urban primary with approximately 400 pupils aged from 5 to 12, and it 
also  ran a nursery.  The school employed one Head teacher, one Deputy who  taught 
virtually full-time, 14 full-time teaching staff,  one full-time secretary and various 
educational and non-educational part-time ancillary staff.  
It was run by the Local Education Authority, who delegated 85% of the 1995/96 budget 
of c.£700,000 to the school to manage under the Local Management of Schools (LMS) 
scheme.  This was but one element of a process of reform to the relationships between 
schools, their governing bodies, local authorities and central government, which was set 
in motion by the 1988 Education Reform Act and subsequent legislation.  A key feature 
of these reforms  was the increase in the power of central government and its agencies in 
matters of curriculum, inspection and funding arrangements at the expense of local 
authorities’ powers.  A parallel feature of the reforms was an increase in the formal 
responsibilities of school governing bodies over matters such as expenditure of delegated 
budgets, reporting to parents, producing School Development Plans, and health and 
safety. 
Our overall impression of the school was that it was a stable, efficiently run and friendly 
school which enjoyed a good local reputation.  This impression was confirmed by a 
positive inspection by OFSTED (Office for Standards in Education, a statutory 
government agency) subsequent to the research.  There was an active parents’ 
organisation which raised funds for the school. 
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 Governance 
The full Governing Body normally met once a term, with agendas averaging 17 items and 
meetings typically lasting 2 to 3 hours.  The local education authority suggested draft 
agendas, which the school usually followed. 
There were 16 governors, comprising 4 elected parent-governors, 2 teacher governors, 5 
local authority appointed governors (1 by the Town Council, 4 by the County), 4 co-opted 
governors and the Head. 
There were the following committees: 
Premises & Finance : met 5 times a year 
Pupils and Personnel : met 4 times a year 
Curriculum :  met 3 times a year 
First and Pay : met once a year and in emergencies.  
‘Chairs’  : less formal meetings of Chair, Head & Committee Chairs, which  were held 
when necessary (approximately once a term), in theory to co-ordinate preparation and 
follow up to full board meetings. 
The LEA provided model terms of reference relating to the duties of governors, the roles 
and powers of sub-committees, the delegation of responsibilities to Head and sub-
committees and other matters.  The school followed these guidelines.  Most governors  
were allocated some formal responsibility: Chair of a Committee, link person with other 
school governing bodies, or with the parents association.  In addition each governor was 
formally allocated to make links with particular year groups. 
The board was serviced by the clerk, who was also the School Secretary.  She was the 
extent of the school’s non-teaching administrative resource, and appeared to see servicing 
the Governing Body as an administrative matter  within her line management 
responsibility to the Head.  
4.2 College 
 Regulatory environment 
The College is regulated by the Further Education Funding Council (FEFC), a 
government appointed body which specifies how colleges  are governed and funded and 
which prescribes (with varying degrees of discretion) what services they may and may not 
provide. Central government legislation removed all UK Further Education Colleges from 
local authority control in 1993, and they were established as independent incorporated 
bodies whose governors took on responsibilities equivalent to those of company directors. 
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All colleges are subject to rigorous FEFC quality assessments every 4 years: our research 
took place immediately after such an inspection.  
FEFC regulations about college governance are extensive and include matters such as: 
• who board members should be;  
• how they should be appointed; 
• what committees there have to be  (e.g. an Audit Committee); 
• what powers and duties these committees have. 
 Characteristics 
The College operated from four principal sites located in the main towns in the part of the 
semi-urban county it covered.  It was the only FE college serving this region, although 
local students were free to enrol elsewhere and the College attracted students  living 
nearer to other neighbouring colleges.  The College comprised three previously separate 
colleges, which had their own governing bodies. 
It had an annual budget of £25 million, the bulk of which came from a student-related 
block grant from the FEFC.  It also generated some income from local partnerships and 
franchise arrangements.  The College provided education and training services to post-16 
students and adults in five broad curriculum areas : Science & Humanities; Business & 
Administration; Service Industries; Technology & Computing; Visual Communication. 
The College was managed by a Principal (CEO), to whom reported an Associate Principal 
responsible for all finance, personnel and administration matters  and a Curriculum Vice-
Principal responsible for academic matters.  The College’s five curriculum areas were 
grouped under faculties, each headed by a dean.  In addition, each of the main sites had a 
manager responsible for the running of that particular site. 
The research was undertaken in the context of major changes in the funding and role of 
UK further education.  Major voluntary redundancies had been and were continuing to 
take place nationally and in this College.  Student retention and examination result 
performances of colleges were being exposed to public scrutiny and comparison, 
increasing the sense and reality of competition with other providers of post-16 and adult 
education and training.  Our impression was that the College was meeting these 
challenges neither exceptionally better nor worse than other FE colleges. 
 Governance 
The Board (or Corporation) consisted of 16 members, of whom 8 were independent, as 
stipulated by the FEFC, 3  co-opted, one was nominated by the local Training & 
Enterprise Council (TEC), 2 were elected from the staff , 1 from students and 1 was the 
Principal.  The Clerk to the Corporation was accountable to the board,  had office 
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facilities, attends all meetings and, in this case, is a former senior manager of the college.  
Senior managers attend and report to both full board and relevant sub-committees. 
The main sub-committees were: Finance & General Purposes; Personnel; Audit.  In 
addition, there were Search (for board appointments)and Remuneration  sub-committees. 
The full board met 6 times per annum, and also outside the formal cycle; typically one 
away day per term to tackle strategic matters free from the normal agenda.  The sub-
committees met to tie in with the full board cycles and with key stages in the accounting 
and budget-setting cycles.  The F & GP met 9 times per annum, the Audit Committee 5 
times. 
Individual board members were also tasked to work with individual managers on 
particular issues. 
4.3 Local Voluntary Organisation 
 Regulatory environment 
The local voluntary organisation is a both a company limited by guarantee and a 
registered charity.  The former means that it is subject to the UK Companies Acts, but 
unlike a commercial company it has named guarantors rather than shareholders and their 
liability is limited to a nominal amount specified in a Memorandum and Articles of 
Association.  These Acts require the company to have a Board of Directors elected in 
accordance with the Memorandum and Articles: in legal terms the Executive Committee 
of the LVO served as this Board.  
Registration as a charity places the LVO under the auspices of the Charities Acts, and the 
specific regulatory framework of the Charity Commission.  The LVO’s Executive 
Committee also serve as the trustees required by charity legislation: they must have no 
pecuniary interest in the charity and their primary purpose is to ensure that the 
organisation promotes and safeguards its charitable objectives. 
 Characteristics 
The LVO was set up in 1975 by a group of volunteers concerned at the lack of support for 
victims of domestic violence in the area.  In 1977, it opened a home for families in need 
of temporary accommodation.  By 1996, the LVO ran 6 such homes, two advice centres 
and a telephone advice line, and had thus become very much a service-provision 
organisation.  In this time it changed, under the influence of its present Chief Executive, 
from being a collectively run organisation in the 1980s to the more formal and 
conventional organisation structure we encountered (Chief Executive, Deputy, Finance 
Officer, etc.). 
Its annual budget of £320,000  came principally from three main sources: local authority 
grant aid, premises supplied by Housing Associations and the local authority, and rent 
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from the families staying in its homes (which in practice is paid by the government 
through the Housing Benefit scheme) 
 Governance 
The LVO had six Directors, one Company Secretary and attending representatives from 
the housing associations, local authority and staff.  Four staff did most of the Committee 
servicing - the CEO, her Deputy, the Finance Officer and the minute-taking 
Administrative Officer - but  all other staff were invited to observe Executive Committee 
meetings.  The Directors were approached by the CEO or other prominent members of 
the existing committee from the ranks of organisations and professions with which the 
LVO works: the police, social services, solicitors’ practices, community organisations, 
etc. 
Committee meetings took place approximately every six weeks.  Different interview 
respondents report different roles, structures and frequency of meetings of sub-
committees: there seemed to be one, possibly two, infrequent ones covering finance and 
personnel, and a group established to help on the Business Plan. 
Committee meetings were friendly and chatty, with approximately two or three 
substantive items on each agenda.  The organisation was experiencing some financial 
problems but appeared to enjoy the respect and support of its funders and agencies with 
which it worked. 
4.5 National Voluntary Organisation 
 Regulatory environment 
Like the LVO, the NVO is a registered charity and a company limited by guarantee.  It is 
thus also regulated by the requirements both of company law and of the Charity 
Commission. 
 Characteristics 
The NVO was set up in 1979 to work with partner organisations in some of the world’s 
poorest countries by providing technological aid and support appropriate to their needs 
and circumstances.  It had seven paid staff operating from two UK sites.  The NVO also 
ran a development education programme in the UK and lobbied government and larger 
aid agencies.  Annual income of £2 - 300,000 came from workshop rents, grants, 
international aid bodies and donations. 
Set up by a group of volunteers, the founder of the organisation left the staff in 1995 and 
the NVO was in a period of transition, with the majority of staff being recent 
appointments.   
Governance 
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The national organisation had members, who elected the seven trustees (who also act as 
Directors under company law) by postal ballot before the Annual General Meeting.  In 
addition there were about 70 local groups  affiliated to the national organisation.  Many of 
the members were active in these local groups. 
The board of trustees met approximately 4 times per annum, in different locations.  There 
was also an annual week-end meeting after the AGM, which focused on strategy and 
provided an opportunity for new board members and staff to get to know each other.  Full 
board meetings averaged 15 to 20 items on their agendas and often lasted from mid-
morning to late afternoon. 
There were five sub-committees, each meeting between 2 to 4 times a year:  
• Partnership & Requests - which dealt with overseas partner organisations and aid; 
• Group & Development Education - which dealt with local affiliated supporters’ 
groups and with the development education work 
• Finance - including fund-raising 
• Workshop & Site 
• Employment 
The sub-committees were serviced by staff members working in that particular area.  
Each sub-committee had two to three directors on it, one of whom chaired it. 
At the time of the research, the organisation appeared to be well established and 
respected.  There were occasional tensions between providing aid, and the development 
and educational work of the organisation. 
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(5) ‘Choosing’ and developing board members 
There are essentially two main ways of improving the competencies and skills of board 
members to carry out their roles more effectively.   One is by trying to improve the 
quality of candidates who put themselves forward  through better recruitment and 
selection, or nomination and election, procedures.  The other is by providing better 
opportunities for existing board members to develop their knowledge and skills and their 
ability to work together.  This chapter examines how, in each of the cases, people became 
board members and what opportunities they had to develop their skills, in order to see 
what lessons can be learned. 
5.1 Becoming a board member 
‘But there is, and will continue to be, a tension between the management driven 
and output related approach which is central to many recent changes, and the 
need for organisations providing public services to involve, respond to, and 
reflect the concerns of the communities which they serve.’  (Nolan, 1996) 
Historically, in many public and voluntary organisations there has been a strong tradition 
that those on the board should represent the communities the organisation serves.  Two 
different mechanisms have been used to achieve this end, direct elections of board 
members from a defined constituency, or through giving key stakeholders the right to 
appoint members to the board.  In Section 3 we called this a political model of 
governance.  Over the last decade due in part to the changes in public policy mapped out 
in Section 2, there has been a shift in emphasis towards a more managerial model of 
governance with its stress on efficiency and effectiveness, and the competencies that 
board members  need to fulfil their role effectively.  This creates an important tension for 
voluntary and non-profit organisations; should board members be ‘chosen’ because of 
their expertise, or as lay representatives of particular groups?  This section examines the 
different methods used to choose board members, and some of the perceived advantages 
and disadvantages.  In selecting our case studies we deliberately chose organisations to 
include those where most board members were elected or appointed by external 
stakeholders ( the NVO and the School) and  those where they were mainly selected (the 
LVO and the College). 
 Composition of the boards 
As schools have been given greater autonomy, and FE  Colleges have been taken out of 
local education authority (LEA) control, the way governors are chosen has changed 
significantly.  In the past a system of political appointments operated, where most 
governors were nominated by the LEA.  Now in schools, local authority appointed 
governors are a minority, and  local councillors can only be co-opted members on the 
boards of FE Colleges. 
These changes were reflected in the composition of governing bodies at our two case 
studies.  At the School there were 4 parent governors and 2 teacher governors who were 
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elected, 5 governors who were appointed by the local authority (two of whom were 
parents with children at the school), and another 4 co-opted governors.  At the College 
there were 16 governors of whom 8 were defined as independent.  The independent 
governors were required to come from the business and professional community and were 
selected by the existing board.  These included senior managers from large and medium-
sized local businesses and an accountant from a local firm.  The other governors 
comprised a nominee from the local TEC (a requirement); two staff members and a 
student member who were elected ; the College Principal and three co-opted members.  
The co-opted members were drawn from the public sector: a university lecturer, a nurse 
education specialist and a barrister  active in local politics. 
Although both the voluntary organisations in the study were formally membership 
organisations they differ substantially in how new directors were chosen.  The NVO had a 
wide external membership.  The organisation was governed by a board of 7 directors 
(currently 6 because of a resignation) who were also trustees of the charity.  The directors 
were elected by the membership using a postal ballot (if elections were contested) at the 
time of the AGM.  Directors were elected for a period of  3 years, with 2 or 3 standing 
down each year.  At the LVO the only members were the current board.  Hence new 
board members were essentially selected by the current board.  There were 6 directors 
(currently 5, because of a resignation).  There were two representatives from housing 
associations with which the organisation works and an observer from the local authority, 
but formally these were not directors.  
 The perceived impact of political appointments 
In both the School and the College senior managers and board members felt quite 
strongly that the changes in the composition and role of  the governing bodies following 
recent legislative changes had been an improvement. Most of those interviewed had 
experienced boards both before and after these changes.  There was a perception that the 
old system of political appointments led to a ‘talking shop’, and brought into the 
organisation wider political difference and divisions.  The Head at the School commented 
on a previous governing body: 
‘I’ve had it happen in other schools - in my previous headship .  And that was for 
political reasons basically.  You suddenly find the governing body divided on political 
grounds and they’re scoring points off each other and in between you’re left trying to run 
the school.’ 
There was also a feeling that the old system produced governors that were not so 
committed to the organisation and more concerned about representing particular interests.  
One governor at the College put it: 
‘The old board was not as committed, it was an extension of the old boy network whose 
time had passed.  Gradually, we have asserted a more vigorous role’ 
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In contrast some commentators have expressed concern about the loss of local 
accountability.  However, this view was not shared by governors or staff interviewed at 
the School or College, and no one expressed concern over the reduction in political 
appointments. 
 Selection 
At the College the move to a new corporate structure and the new rules about who could 
be a governor had been used to change the composition of the board.  The Board now had 
the power to select the majority of its members.  Led originally by the Principal, and then 
by the Board as a whole, people in senior management and professional positions in local 
firms were approached to join.  The dominant view was that they needed to attract people 
with business and management skills that could help the College survive in what was 
perceived as an increasingly uncertain and competitive environment.  As one member of 
the Board’s Search Committee put it: 
‘We are seeking to fill those [vacancies] with industrial members rather than otherwise, 
so there is a clear feeling that we need more weight on that side to help us survive the 
future.  It’s an increasingly cold, business-like financial environment.’ 
There is a strong perception among board members and senior managers that bringing in 
governors from the business community  strengthened the ability of the Board to carry out 
its role.  The board was now more questioning of what management did and was able to 
bring in relevant experience from elsewhere.  As one governor said: 
‘[the corporation is] bringing together a diverse group of people who have in common 
that they’ve operated at a senior level  in another organisation and creating as a result of 
that a sort of chemistry that challenges, excites, motivates and persuades the College to 
look outwards and to identify best practice, to bring on board best practice ...  I honestly 
think they would go down the drain if they didn’t have the Corporation.’ 
The Principal of the College felt that an acid test of this new level of  competence was 
that the Board would now have the confidence to sack him if necessary: 
‘they’re enhancing [this organisation] in so far as I now feel that they have the self-
confidence to sack me.  Now that is actually very significant.’ 
One of the common criticisms of boards (or groups) that select their own members is that 
this can lead to a narrow self-perpetuating elite.  Some members of the Board were 
concerned that the Board did reflect a rather narrow group that was unrepresentative of 
the wider college community: 
‘My only concern is the fact that it’s the middle aged, middle class, comfortably-off 
syndrome if you are not careful.  You’re not representing the majority of the College in 
that respect...Sometime I would like to see a bit more youthful dynamism ... I feel as 
though you’re probably a very narrow field of people controlling the whole College.’ 
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At the LVO all board members were self-selected.  Selection was very much an informal 
process.  Usually people would be suggested who were known through the networks of 
the Director, or occasionally those of other board members.  For example the Director 
described how she had tried to get someone from an ethnic minority on the Board: 
‘I suggested to [the committee] that they might like to make another attempt to recruit 
somebody form the ethnic community and I asked them if they’d take that on because I’d 
run out of places to look...’ 
As a result of this selection process, most board members had some previous contact with 
the organisation, often in a professional capacity.  For example one member who was a 
solicitor worked for a firm which had done legal work for the organisation, and two had 
been  Council representative on the board prior to their retirement. 
The implicit strategy of the Director in suggesting board members was to try to get people 
who would be sympathetic to the organisation and who could add value through their 
professional knowledge and networks.  Board members had links with a variety of 
important stakeholders such as the Police, Social Services and the local authority’s 
Homelessness Unit. 
‘its very local ... you’ve got people ... who between them have got a knowledge and a lot 
of contacts about the town and how it works.’ 
This selection strategy had benefits in terms of the organisation’s external relations.  It 
has led to a supportive and well connected board.  However, it has also contributed to 
certain board weaknesses.  The emphasis on selecting people for their professional 
knowledge and contacts concerning the service of the organisation, rather than their 
knowledge or experience of governance or management, had contributed to the Board 
being unsure of its governance role, and less capable of challenging or developing the 
management of the organisation. 
 Representative systems 
The two cases where representative systems of choosing board members were dominant 
were the School and the NVO.  As we have seen, at the School elected and externally 
appointed governors formed the majority on the governing body.  At the NVO all board 
members were elected from the wider membership.  In both these organisations there was 
a recognition that involving  people who had a very direct interest in the organisation 
such as parents and members had certain advantages.  These people were likely to be 
more committed to the organisation and more active than other board members.  As the 
Head at the School said: 
‘Of those groups, however, it tends to be the parent governors that are the most active in 
everything that is going on, , they are the ones most interested in what is happening, and 
they are the ones that will be here for all the meetings and no doubt many School events 
as well.’ 
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The main disadvantage of a representative system is that board members may not have  
the expertise and experience it would be desirable to have on the board.  At the NVO, 
staff members tended to see deficiencies in the board in relation to their own area of 
expertise; financial management, personnel management and development education 
were all mentioned.  At the School the Head would have liked more governors who could 
bring experiences of  management or governance from other organisations. 
However, there is an issue about what skills board members can realistically be expected 
to have when they are chosen through elections.  One of the Co-ordinators at the NVO 
felt that the advantages of this system had to be weighed against any possible 
disadvantages:  
‘The way the board is formed, ...  somebody who is elected by the membership, is totally 
unrealistic to expect to have those type of people sitting around in the membership 
waiting to sit on your board.  I think you only get that type of people on if you are co-
opting people on and then you lose the interest bit and the dedication bit, which they have 
got.’ 
 Informal networks 
So far this section has looked at some of the differences in methods of choosing board 
members and their particular advantages and disadvantages.  However, there was one 
similarity between all the cases - how in practice all the methods relied quite heavily on 
the use of informal contacts and personal networks.  In both the College and the LVO, 
where selection was the main method used to choose board members, personal contacts 
and networks were used to suggest people suitable for nomination to the board. 
Perhaps more surprisingly in the other cases where board members were chosen through 
elections or political appointments, extensive use was also made of personal networks in 
order to get people to stand for election or be nominated as representatives.  As one of the 
Co-ordinators at the NVO put it: 
‘...it’s very difficult to get people to stand actually, so often when we know someone is 
coming off the Board, staff and the Directors will do a bit of chivvying round to see if 
anyone who might be approachable would be interested in standing...’ 
At the School a network of people around the local church and the Liberal Democratic 
Party had been associated with the School for years and used to approach people known 
to them to put themselves forward to be LEA governors, co-opted as individuals or to 
suggest they stand for election as parent governors. 
Using networks is often a relatively quick and easy way of finding willing people with the 
right skills and experience to be board members.  However, it can also have 
disadvantages.  Networks are limited and some groups will be excluded.  Using networks 
is also essentially a private activity which lacks openness and transparency.  It is difficult 
for those not in the know to see why certain people are asked to stand, or it can be 
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difficult for those outside the network to know how to put themselves forward as possible 
board members.  There is a danger then that networks can lead to a narrow, closed group 
of board members.  At all the organisations there was some concern about this.  At the 
School the Deputy Head said: 
‘ the governing body is not as diverse as we‘d like it to be’ 
 Cooptees,  advisors and observers 
Various other methods were also used to bring people on to the board.  Both the School 
and College used co-options either to get someone from a particular group that is not 
represented or to try to get people with certain skills on the board.  In the College co-
options were used to bring onto the board other public sector or community interests that 
were not represented.  Of the three cooptions one was a university lecturer, another a 
nurse education specialist and the third a woman barrister from the Asian community, 
who was active politically.  At the School the strategy was more to use co-options to 
bring people with particular expertise onto the board.  However, in practice they had 
found this more difficult than the College.  It is easier to attract professionals to the 
boards of large high status organisations such as the College than a small School.  In 
addition, in a small town it was not always possible to find people with the skills who 
were willing to stand, as the Head said when asked if they looked for people with 
particular skills: 
‘I would like to think we do.  But in practice it hasn’t been like that, because in practice it 
is quite difficult to find people to come forward.  Certainly, in the past I’ve known it to 
happen.  They’ve deliberately trawled for someone with particular sorts of skills’. 
The NVO and the LVO have used advisers and observers respectively to bring other 
people on the board.  At the NVO a voluntary financial adviser was appointed to fill a 
recognised gap in the expertise of the board: 
‘We between us lack much experience or skill on formal financial matters and as a Board 
in the past we have recognised that deficiency and we have endeavoured to cover it by the 
honorary appointment of a financial adviser who currently is a Chartered Accountant.’ 
The decision to appoint an adviser without voting rights rather than a cooptee was so as 
not to undermine the principle that board members were elected by the membership. 
The LVO had three outside people who were invited to meetings but who were not 
formally members of the Board with voting rights, although some board members 
themselves had different opinions of their status.  Essentially these people were seen as 
representatives or links with important stakeholders the organisation worked with.  (In 
practice this was not that different from the way the rest of the board was used.) Two 
were called ‘housing association representatives’ and the other was an ‘observer’ from the 
Council, which was one of the main funders of the organisation. 
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5.2 Developing board members and boards 
Opportunities for board members to develop their skills can be provided ‘in house’ 
through the experience of  carrying out their role, and through processes such as 
induction, mentoring and training, or the provision of external training courses, advice 
and assistance.  In 1992, the Working Party on Trustee Training, established by the 
NCVO and the Charity Commission, concluded that generally there was a serious lack of 
advice, support and training for trustees of voluntary organisations, and what there was 
often inaccessible or unsuitable.  While the situation has improved somewhat since then 
provision is still very patchy.  The availability of training for school and college 
governors is better.  With the move to Local Management of Schools, LEAs have 
provided training courses for school governors.  The regional associations of FE Colleges 
provide training courses for College governors. 
 Initial induction and training 
At both the voluntary organisations any initial induction or training was very limited.  At 
the LVO board members were offered no internal induction.  There was a sense for a 
majority that this limited their effectiveness: 
‘An assumption was made when I joined the organisation that I would know what I was 
doing...’ 
Most board members had taken part in some training arranged by the local Council for 
Voluntary Service on the roles and responsibilities of trustees.  However, this course was 
fairly recent and did not necessarily occur when board members needed it most: 
‘the [training] would have been more useful if I’d had it four years earlier’ 
There was also a feeling that the course highlighted their responsibilities without giving 
them the skills to cope with them. 
At the NVO little attention had been paid to induction in the past.  One director who was 
elected nearly five years ago commented: 
‘I think somebody suddenly remembered to have one sheet of A4 which vaguely said 
‘rules and responsibilities of being a Director’, but it was terribly vague and awfully 
outdated and there was absolutely no real induction.’ 
The new Co-ordinator  tried to make sure better information is available to directors.  
However even when information is available there may be a reluctance by directors to 
read it.  One director who was elected more recently commented: 
‘[the co-ordinator] was a bit anxious about this sort of thing, rightly so, and she produced 
a big file, which is produced I think by the Charity Commission on the duties of trustees, 
some of which is relevant and some of which wasn’t.  I waded through some of it but it 
took some wading through  and... I wasn’t too keen on doing it.’ 
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The initial training for School and College governors focused primarily on their legal and 
financial responsibilities.  Whilst in general among the School governors this was felt to 
be useful introduction, it was limited in two respects.  First, the absence of any training in 
process skills was seen as a weakness.  For example one new governor who felt the 
course was excellent also felt completely ill -prepared when she was asked to take over 
chairing a sub-committee.  Second, the absence of any in-house induction still meant that 
many new governors were unclear of the particular contribution they could make to the 
School.  Perhaps because of the experience and skills of those involved, the initial 
training for College governors was not mentioned by any governors as a significant part 
of their development. 
 Learning by experience 
The main way board members learned how to perform their role was through experience.  
However, because boards meet relatively infrequently, learning by experience can take a 
long time.  At the School the Head felt that: 
‘..for any governors it takes the best part of a year before they become fully effective as a 
governor.’ 
This experience was born out elsewhere.  The most recently elected governor at the NVO 
still felt that he was very much a ‘new boy’ after serving as a board member for 18 
months.  Even though he had experience of working with the board of a small business he 
still felt it would take him his full term of office (three years) to become fully effective: 
‘By the third year I shall feel that I’m understanding what we are doing and know where 
I can and can’t use some muscle....’ 
The way the board is run, and the way it is used and serviced by managers can have a 
significant impact on board members’ ability to learn from experience and become 
effective.  This was most apparent at the LVO, where we identified a number of factors 
that inhibited the development of board members.  The informal way the board was run 
and the rather patchy information it received meant that with one or two notable 
exceptions most board members felt out of their depth on some occasions or failed to 
realise the significance of some issues.  As one member put it: 
‘I am not very good at [speaking up] partly because I don’t necessarily feel I’ve got all 
the information there often...’ 
Another member commented about improving the financial literacy of the board: 
‘When you don’t talk about it , you never think about it, do you?’ 
 Opportunities for team building and reviewing the performance of the board 
The performance of a board depends not only on the expertise and skills of its members, 
but on how well members work together and with management as a team.  As a result, 
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boards that pay attention to team building and regularly reviewing how they work as a 
board are likely to be most effective.  Evidence from the case studies supported this 
proposition. 
At the College the Chair felt that the formal nature of meetings, the many rules 
concerning what they could and couldn’t do and the heavy agendas constrained the ability 
of board members and senior managers to work effectively together.  As a result the Chair 
and the Chief Executive made use of informal meetings and governors’ workshop to 
tackle particular problems and to develop more effective team working.  The board also 
held a workshop without managers where they reviewed their performance as a board. 
At the NVO they had an annual weekend meeting after the AGM so that new board and 
staff could get to know each other, and there was an opportunity for team building and to 
think together about strategy.  The board had not, though, built into its programme any 
regular opportunity for reviewing its performance.  However, the arrival of the new Co-
ordinator and her desire to clarify the role of the board and its relationship with staff had 
led to a process of review which was valued by the majority of staff and board members. 
In contrast, at the LVO it was the absence of any opportunities for review and team 
building that partly explained why some board members felt ineffective and why the 
Board relied so heavily on one long-standing member and the Chief Executive.  Two 
different members of the board commented: 
‘I would like to discuss roles and have an afternoon session or something with the full 
board, may be with a facilitator, to look at how we work and just get to know each other.  
Team building I suppose...’ 
‘I don’t think there’s any space for us to review our decision-making process and 
whether that could have been assisted or changed..’ 
The Chief Executive Officer (CEO) can play an important role in facilitating or inhibiting 
the development of the board.  At the LVO the CEO did little to encourage the 
development of the Board as whole, indeed she seemed to perceive their working closely 
together as a team as a threat: 
‘You could have a group who were ... chummy chummy..[and] go on away days and get to 
know each other, live in each others pockets maybe and who may function well as a 
group, but who may be even less use than they are now to the organisation... Because.. it 
may be dangerous as well because at the moment they will have their own opinions.  They 
won’t have been influenced by anybody.  There won’t have been any lobbying because 
that doesn’t happen here.’ 
5.3 Conclusions 
Below is a summary of the main findings from the research concerning the methods of 
choosing and developing board members, and the implications for practice. 
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Findings  
• Boards face a tension between choosing board members who in some way represent 
or reflect the concerns of the communities or stakeholders the organisation works 
with and selecting board members for their skills and experience. 
• Whatever system of choosing board members is used, there are likely to be gaps on 
the board in terms of people with particular expertise or who can reflect the views of 
important stakeholders.  Co-options and advisers to the board can often be used to fill 
important gaps and achieve a more balanced board. 
• In all four cases, irrespective of whether board members were elected, selected or 
appointed by external stakeholders, extensive use was made of informal networks in 
order to find potential board members.  This process was not open or transparent to 
outsiders and there was a danger that it could lead to narrow, closed group of board 
members. 
• Managers in the School and College felt that boards that consisted mainly of external 
political appointments were less effective than those where members were selected or 
elected. 
• The information that was available to new or prospective board members about their 
role and responsibilities was inadequate in some of the cases. 
• Where initial training on the role and responsibilities of being a board member was 
readily available it was taken up and valued by many board members.  However, this 
training tended to concentrate on the legal responsibilities of  board members and did 
little to develop the skills which board members needed, or their understanding of 
different approaches to governance. 
• Most  board members learn about governance on the job, through experience.  For 
most board member it took at least a year to become fully effective. 
• Attention to induction, team-building and regular review of board performance were 
important in developing effective boards.  Senior managers and chairs could play an 
important role in encouraging or discouraging these processes. 
Implications for practice 
(1) Boards need to periodically review the kinds of skills, experience, links and 
interests it would be beneficial to have on the board, and the strengths and 
weaknesses of the existing board. 
Without such a review, boards may be unaware of important gaps in their expertise and 
be unable to formulate ways of dealing with the problem.  If boards are clear what gaps 
exist, they may be able to take steps to deal with them, for example through co-options or 
external advisers. 
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(2) Many board would benefit from adopting a more open and proactive 
approach to ‘recruiting’ new board members. 
Our study and other research suggests that many organisations rely heavily on informal 
networks to get board members to be nominated for selection, appointment or election.  
This has the advantage of being relatively inexpensive, and is likely to result in board 
members that will fit in with the existing board.  However, it has the disadvantage that it 
may lead to a narrow board and exclude many people who have important skills or 
experience to offer the organisation.  How boards can achieve a more open and proactive 
approach to ‘recruiting’ new members will depend on the method used for choosing 
board members.  In those boards where members are selected it may be achieved through 
advertising for members with appropriate skills and going through a formal selection 
process.  Boards where members are elected may want to consider how they can 
encourage a wider range of nominations, and get candidates to be explicit about what they 
can offer the organisation and what they would like to achieve on the board. 
(3) Organisations should provide prospective and new board members with 
information about their responsibilities, role and likely time commitments. 
One way of setting expectations for new board members and helping them to clarify their 
role is to provide them written information about their responsibilities, role and likely 
commitments.  In general the cases studied were poor in this respect.  In one case very 
little information was provided, in another a lot of general information was provided but 
little specific to the organisation concerned. 
(4) Organisations should provide a process of induction and support to new 
board members. 
It takes a long time for most board members to gain confidence and become effective in 
their role.  This process can be assisted through careful induction, training and support to 
new board members.  This need not necessarily be an elaborate formal programme, for 
example linking new board members with experienced members can be helpful. 
(5) The chair and CEO need to build in opportunities for team building, review 
and development into the working of the board. 
Boards are often so busy getting on with their work that they neglect to consider their 
own performance and development.  In particular it is important that boards and senior 
staff work effectively as a team.  The chair, or failing that the chief executive, should take 
responsibility for board development. 
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(6) Board - Management Relationships 
This section focuses on the relationship between  boards and managers across the four 
cases.  First it analyses the balance of power between boards and managers.  Then it 
assesses two of the key factors in shaping board-management relationships and how the 
governance function is enacted: the organisation of board meetings and information.  
These terms are defined widely: meetings include sub-committees and informal meetings; 
information goes beyond formal meeting-related papers to include the various ways in 
which board members inform themselves about the workings of the organisations they 
govern.  Finally, it assesses the distinctive roles which boards play, and the contributions 
they make, using as a reference point the stewardship, managerial and democratic models 
of governance outlined in Section 3.   
6.1 Patterns of Power 
One of the contradictions facing board members is that while they have formal 
responsibility for the organisation and are the ultimate authority within it, they are often 
depend on management for information, to formulate proposals and to carry them out.  
This dependence on management means that managers may be able to exercise 
considerable power. 
Empirical studies suggest that the balance of power between governing bodies and 
management can vary considerably.  Murray (1996) in a review of some of the empirical 
literature suggests four common patterns of power.  He suggests the most common is the 
‘CEO-dominant’ pattern, where the CEO gathers information and formulates decisions to 
be ratified by the board as a whole.  The next most common is the ‘board-dominant’ 
pattern, often found in smaller, younger organisations, where a core group on the board 
plays the main role in formulating policies and proposals for the board, and the CEO is 
just one player in this process.  Another pattern he calls  ‘staff-dominant’, often found in 
professional bureaucracies, such as universities and hospitals, where senior professional 
staff often have the power to devise strategy and the CEO and board feel constrained to 
go along with it.  The final pattern he calls ‘collective governance’ where there is an 
active coalition between different stakeholders and a commitment to consensual decision-
making. 
Wood (1992) has also suggested that the balance of power between boards and managers 
is likely to change over time.  She suggests a life-cycle model where after an initial 
‘collective’ phase the board tends to oscillate between a ‘CEO dominant’ pattern and, 
precipitated by some crisis, a ‘board dominant’ phase, followed by a gradual drift back to 
CEO dominance, until the next crisis. 
Of the four cases two corresponded closely to patterns identified by Murray.  The School 
was closest to the CEO-dominant pattern and the NVO to the collective pattern.  In the 
LVO, the CEO in conjunction with a dominant board member exercised a dominant 
coalition.  Whereas at the College neither the board nor senior management dominated.  
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Each was recognised to have a distinctive and influential role, which we will call a 
partnership pattern. 
In two of the cases the research took place during a process of changing power relations.  
At the College there was a shift in power from the management to the board, form a CEO 
dominated to a partnership pattern.  Whereas the NVO appeared to be moving from a 
collective to a more clearly defined partnership.  All, however, exposed that there are 
constraints of time, expertise and information which influence board relationships with 
managers. 
CEO domination at the School 
At the School the Head’s power stemmed from two main sources:  his professional 
expertise, and his ability to control the board agenda and the information and proposals 
that went to board.  In contrast most board members regarded themselves very much as 
lay members, who with a  few exceptions had little experience of management or boards. 
As two governors said: 
‘We do feel that at present he has a powerful say.  Governors fall in behind him rather 
than discuss matters fully and properly.  Often the time pressure of the agenda limits 
debate.  The Head puts situations verbally at the meetings and things go through on the 
nod.  It’s not necessarily healthy to be always leaving things to the Head’s professional 
view.’ 
‘It’s very much introducing the items on the agenda and then handing over to [the Head] 
to explain, mostly.....  he is the only one that knows, because he’s put it on the agenda and 
basically I think items are put up and we’ve either got to say, yes we agree or no we 
don’t. 
This situation created something of a dilemma for the Head.  On the one hand he was 
reluctant to cede power to the governors because he felt that as the employed senior 
professional, he had the time and knowledge which the governors lacked to be able to 
make the right decisions.  He also felt that there was an ambiguity in the DfEE guidance 
on governing bodies (DfEE, 1996a) and that in reality he carried the can for what 
happened at the School. 
‘...at the end of the day, if something does go wrong, although the governors may be 
legally responsible, it’s my head that tumbles.  They can all walk away and somebody 
else can be elected.  There is a difficulty in School governance in my opinion at the 
moment.’  
On the other hand the Head was uneasy about exercising too much of a leadership role, 
and felt that he had to present governors with all the options. 
‘In terms of my own leading of them or not...  there are obviously occasions when I can 
see things which may not be in the best long term interests of the School and I set them up 
that way in the briefing papers or whatever.  However, I try to be fair to them in all times 
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and put both sides of things and all options there, and it is for others to judge how fair 
that is, because it is difficult to tell when you are involved in it.’ 
The important proviso to the power of the Head was that it was with the consent of the 
board.  The governors were conscientious in scrutinising the Head’s proposals, and  their 
consent could not be taken totally for granted.  One recent decision had been taken to the 
vote when there was a concern that the Head may have over-stepped his powers.  In 
general, although there was some recognition that it was not ideal for Head to have so 
much power, governors were content for this to happen because they trusted the Head to 
do a good job.   
‘Personally, I see it as very much a supportive role for [the Head] and to the School, 
really.  We can support him because he’s doing such a good job.’   
A CEO-board member coalition at the LVO 
At the LVO there was also a recognition among most board members that the CEO had a 
good deal of power.  This stemmed from her expertise, knowledge of what was going on 
in the organisation and control of information.  Board members were selected  for their 
contacts, and for their sympathy with and knowledge of the type of work the organization 
did, and  apart from one member had little relevant business or management expertise or 
experience of serving on boards 
‘We Board Members...., who are not part of the organisation, are so dependent on [staff] 
for the information and the understanding of what is going on, that it is almost like 
guiding and ratifying what they are proposing rather than much initiative coming from 
us’ 
The CEO was far more comfortable with this non-challenging support, and helped to 
ensure it by keeping the board out of involvement with the organisation, and limiting the 
opportunities for the board members to work together to develop their role: 
‘You could have a group who were....chummy chummy...[and] go on away days and get to 
know each other, live in each others’ pockets maybe and who may function well as a 
group but who may be even less use than they are now to the organisation......it may be 
dangerous as well because at the moment they come in, they will have their own 
unadulterated opinions.  They won’t have been influenced by anybody.  There won’t have 
been any lobbying because that doesn’t happen here’ 
‘The sort of management committee I deal with is probably verging on the ideal.  I can’t 
think of a way I would improve it.  I actually like the distance with the comfort of 
knowing that they are there for me if I need them.  It’s like running home to Mum.’  
Not all board members were without influence.  One member because of her business and 
financial expertise, close involvement with the CEO and forceful personality occupied a 
dominant role on the board.  She had established an informal ‘dominant coalition’ with 
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the CEO to the extent that other board members let the CEO have her power provided 
this board member was behind her:  
I think that if it wasn’t for XXX...the other people seem a bit lightweight....if [the CEO] 
really needed an opinion, a definite bit of advice, it would be XXX....I think perhaps she is 
the key to the board.  The others are there for support’ 
‘The others listen to what she says and if she thinks it’s OK then....it’s OK.  Because they 
don’t understand, especially on the financial side’  
The power of these two was reinforced by the poor management information systems in 
the organisation.  This meant board information, particularly financial information, was 
often poorly prepared and difficult to interpret. 
However the dimension of consent was also present in the LVO; the CEO saw her power 
as delegated by the board.The board, although often reliant on the advice of the dominant 
member, saw itself as sufficiently expert to know that what the CEO was doing merited 
their support: 
‘there are different ways of achieving similar ends and my main concern is that through 
me upwards and downwards the organisation achieves its objectives....and to do that it 
needs to provide a service and stay solvent and both of those responsibilities are 
delegated by the management committee to me’                                      [LVO CEO]The 
board, because it is not involved on a day to day delivery basis has the capability of 
being objective.  It has between it the skills to emphasise and understand different 
elements of the work and convey those to the rest of the group....and thereby to support 
the policy suggestions of the Director.  Without the board, the Director would be in a 
total vacuum.’        [LVO board member] 
This notion of a vacuum is insightful.  It relates to an issue raised in other cases, 
particularly the College : that the CEO is  dependent on  board backing in order to give 
legitimacy to their plans and decisions.  In other words, the power  the CEO, enjoys with 
staff and other stakeholders is simultaneously enhanced by and conditional upon the 
support of the board.  At the College, this legitimacy was required by the circumstances 
of the CEO having to steer a troubled staff through  financial cutbacks and change.   
Changing from a collective pattern of governance at NVO 
At the NVO, historically a strong collective egalitarian ideology had prevailed in the 
organisation, which meant that there was no clear separation of the responsibilities of 
board members (directors) and staff.  Board members, through things such as voluntary 
work and being involved in sub-committees, had a history of being involved in and 
informed about everything in the organisation, although the constraints of time and 
distance meant that in practice there was more policy prioritisation and monitoring than 
actual management.  This collective pattern of governance was being challenged by the 
arrival of a new Co-ordinator, she felt the board was too involved in operational matters, 
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leading to confusion, and wanted to clarify the responsibilities of the board and staff.  
One board member described  relationships as: 
‘ ...  in a state of flux because....  the new Co-ordinator’s.....come in with very different 
ideas about how roles should be apportioned.  In the past, Directors tended to stick their 
fingers in almost any pie they felt like and certainly there was a lot of resentment by staff, 
who felt that the staff should be allowed to get on with their bit and the Directors should 
jolly well give a general overview and then let the staff get on .  [The new co-ordinator] is 
very keen on defining....what is policy and what is operations, and that she has to get on 
with the operational bit and we [the board] should shut up’ 
What appeared to be happening at the NVO was a change from a collective to a 
partnership pattern of governance, where board members retained a good deal of 
influence, but there was a clearer division over where they should exercise power and 
where management and staff should.  The Board were actively involved with staff in 
planning, budget setting and monitoring.  However, there was a recognition that their 
power was constrained in some areas such as strategy and policy development by lack of 
time and expertise.  As  the Co-ordinator said: 
‘So XXX and I put some stuff together...and then we take that to the directors and ask for 
input in it....  they should put that together and then pass it around people, but that is pie 
in the sky; they are not going to have the time or even the hands-on experience to do it .  
You know, I mean if you are working at one job, you cannot do this job as well’ 
The new Co-ordinator wanted to expose and redefine responsibilities and roles.  Such 
issues had been avoided in the tradition of long unfocused meetings in which anybody 
could, and did,  say anything about anything. 
From CEO-dominance to partnership at the College 
The College presented a different scenario: there was a shift in the balance of power from 
CEO-dominance to partnership with a more powerful board, but with the CEO’s 
approval. 
As with the School, the changes in the regulatory environment were an important factor 
in the power relationships.  Until 1993, the College had in effect been run by the 
professionals in the College and in the local education authority, with the governing body 
as a form of theatre where local politicians and community notables had their say.  Since 
incorporation, the Board ( or Corporation) became legally where the buck stopped.  The 
College could now in theory go out of business if it failed to attract and retain enough 
students, and it would be subject to regular and public financial and performance checks 
by the FEFC.  New regulations removed many of the political appointees from the board, 
replacing then in the main with business people who would act as company directors. 
The impact upon board relationships with the CEO and his senior management team,  
under the influence in particular of the Chair who took office in 1994, was significant: 
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‘Up until a year ago [the board] was operating in the old style...essentially advising the 
Principal...whereby the Corporation members now truly exercise a sense of responsibility 
as owners’ 
The Principal welcomed the fact that a group of people whose management and business 
experience he respected now shared the ownership of and responsibility for the College, 
even though we observed that this meant frequent, powerful and effective challenge to 
him at and outside board meetings.  He felt relieved of carrying the sole burden of 
responsibility himself.  He observed wryly: 
‘they are enhancing [this organisation] in so far as I feel that they have the self-
confidence to sack me.  Now that is a very significant change.’ 
An example of board members willingness and ability to challenge management was 
when members of the Finance and General Purposes Committee refused to accept 
managers’ explanations for a serious shortfall in budgeted income during the year - that 
more students had dropped out without paying their fees than could have realistically 
been anticipated.  Board members did not leave the issue until the senior finance staff had 
agreed to change the basis for providing for such drop-puts in future budgets, and to 
change invoicing systems so that students paid at least something before peak drop-out 
times.  What was significant about the intervention was that board members felt 
knowledgeable and confident enough to challenge management and force through a 
change in both the information which the board received and in the organisation’s 
operational systems.  This happened, unplanned in advance as far as we could tell, 
because board members clearly felt confident about their understanding of the issue, its 
importance and their own power. 
At the time of the research, the power relationships were in an interesting state of flux.  
Board members wanted a partnership with a strong manager who managed in the way 
they thought was right: 
‘The CEO is the person we got in there to run the College and I think he has to make the 
decisions and we have to make sure we feel comfortable that he is making the right 
decisions’ 
‘I think if it were a partnership it would be ten times more successful.’ 
However what was meant by a partnership was never clearly defined.  On the one hand 
board members wanted to make it clear to managers that the board was a serious and 
important force in the organisation, that managers could no longer pull the wool over 
their eyes and that board members had expertise and experience which could and should 
be utilised by the management.  On the other hand, their own experience as managers 
and/or senior professionals was such that they wanted strong leadership from a senior 
management team with a powerful strategic vision and the capacity to put it into effect.  
Similarly managers wanted a stronger board, one whose contribution would justify the 
time put into servicing it, but not one which interfered with their authority as managers.  
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The tensions between these various aims was evident during the research, particularly in 
meetings and issues around information. 
Whilst only at the College at the NVO was there evidence that boards felt powerful 
enough to really challenge the CEO and senior management on their proposals, it should 
not be concluded from this that the other boards had no power in the relationship.  In both 
the School and the LVO the notion of agreement, consent or conditionality was 
important; there was an element of discretion in not challenging managerial power, even 
if the capacity to do so effectively was limited by factors of time, expertise and distance.  
Each organisation had developed a modus operandi for sharing power, shaped by a 
complex mix of external regulations, ideological beliefs in the organisation, differences in 
expertise between managers and board members.  In particular the attitudes of senior 
mangers were important and their ability to influence the agenda for meetings and the 
information that board members received were crucial.  These issues are examined in 
more detail next. 
6.2 Board meetings and operational drift 
Board meetings are one of the central arenas where governance takes place and the 
relationship between senior managers and board members is played out.  So how 
meetings are organised and run has a crucial influence on how governance is enacted and 
how effective it is.  A common finding from all the cases was quite a high degree of 
dissatisfaction with meetings, yet apparently little action to surface and address the 
problems.  A typical reaction was that board meetings were overloaded with information 
and spend too long going over details rather that being concerned with the broader 
picture.  This was summed up by a board member at the NVO: 
‘Directors’ meetings are very cluttered with a lot of stuff which is why I would be happy 
to get a lot of the nitty gritty out of it, because we don’t really have time to consider 
things and to make decisions that are long term.  I think that’s why we shy away from 
them so that we can worry about short term things.’ 
Although all the organisations reported problems with meetings, the School and the NVO 
in particular seemed to get bogged down in operational detail, whereas the College and 
the LVO board showed more evidence of surfacing from the pressure of agenda items to 
discuss issues management or board members thought were of importance.  At both the 
School and the NVO board meetings would typically have 15 - 20 items on the agenda.  
The items were usually not prioritised in any way so it was often difficult to distinguish 
which were important items and which were routine.  Both organisations had a variety of 
sub-committees and included reports from these on the agenda. 
The lack of structure and clear focus of the agenda lead to what can be called  operational 
drift.  People became bogged down in the detail of more routine and familiar items that 
arose.  For example at one board meeting we observed at the NVO, members spent nearly 
2 hours, just under half the meeting, discussing reports from sub-committees.  This 
process seems to be reinforced by various psychological processes.  There is a tendency 
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for people who report back to want to justify or share what they have been doing, which 
means they go into more detail than necessary.  It may also be that people are more 
comfortable dealing with these operational issues rather than the uncertainties and 
dilemmas that surround long term strategy or evaluating how the organisation is doing.  
‘... the board tends to repeat previous discussions of sub-committees ..... people want to 
justify what has been done.’  [NVO board member]) 
A number of factors appear significant in influencing the long and unstructured agendas 
for board meetings.  One influence is the regulatory environment.  This was particularly 
true of the School and College.  As one governor of the College remarked: 
‘We have too heavy agendas, too many rules about what we can do and what we can’t do 
- it constrains us.’ 
At the School a number of items arose because of changes in Government policy; in 
addition the local authority made detailed suggestions for what should be on the agenda.  
This heavy external influence perhaps meant that the governors failed to think through 
what their role should be and what best they could contribute to the School.  Instead they 
reacted to external demands. 
Another crucial factor was that often neither senior management or board members had a 
very clear idea what they thought the main functions of governance should be, nor of 
what contribution or value they expected the board to add to the organisation.  Or, if they 
had, it was not related to how agendas for meetings were constructed.  Hence items 
tended to get added to agendas if someone felt they were important without any clear 
flagging of why they were coming to the board, their relative importance or what the 
board was expected to do with them. 
‘We get the agenda, and with the agenda we get all the minutes of the previous meetings.  
We get any papers that have come from County.  We get all the draft policies.  I think it 
wasn’t so much the fact that we get those, but then we all get them again for the full 
governors’ meeting.  But then, if you haven’t sat on the Curriculum Committee, you need 
to know what those policy documents are.  So we do get wads of it to wade through.  I’ve 
got four folders upstairs, of governors’ stuff......’  [School governor] 
With the exception of the College and to some extent the NVO, the evidence was that 
board members felt powerless and lacking in confidence about changing matters for 
Board meetings to make a more effective contribution their organisations.  It may have 
been that real change would involve an already busy staff in more work and effort in 
servicing meetings.  In the Schools and the LVO, any member-driven change might also 
have involved challenging the control of meetings by the CEO, and in the School’s case 
challenging the influence of the Local Education Authority. 
This is not to argue that meetings served no purpose.  They served as a means of members 
feeling involved in the organisation, as forums wherein staff and others could proclaim 
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and justify what they had been doing, as places where information could be shared.   
Members across all organisations expressed overall satisfaction with the way board 
members got on with each other and worked harmoniously for the good of the 
organisation.  Long and sometimes tedious meetings did not seem to dent the overall 
feeling of the worth of the governance function. 
To some extent there is an ever-present tension in governance between what the 
regulatory framework and operational realities impose upon governance agendas and 
what board members would like to see there.  It is unlikely that this tension can ever be 
fully resolved , but it would appear from the four cases that some organisations manage to 
balance the pressures better than others.  The College’s relative success in utilising 
meetings can be attributed to a number of factors: 
• the experience and expertise of board members, including meetings process skills 
(e.g. choosing the moment and the tone of a questioning intervention) 
• the skill and experience of the chair, who had a reasonably clear vision of what 
governance involved and ensured that time was carved out for important issues, such 
as strategy  
• the capacity to delegate matters, to sub-committees, special groups or to individual 
board members, without then re-considering them again in depth at subsequent 
meetings, 
• the fact that the meetings were efficiently serviced by a clerk who was a senior figure 
in the organisation 
6.3 Information 
The information presented to board members is an important influence on the 
effectiveness of any board, as well as being an indicator of the relationships between 
board and management.  Do boards know enough either to scrutinise and challenge 
proposals  from management, or to serve a useful performance-enhancing purpose, or to 
do both? 
Information may be gathered through both formal and informal channels.  Genuine board 
member access to an organisation’s staff, premises, clients and operations can sometimes 
reveal farmore than board papers.  It is also qualitative as well as quantitative - copying 
for the board all of the documents and figures which managers use in their work does not 
necessarily mean that the board is well-informed.  Its members can be swamped, or the 
board level implications may be unclear,  thereby preventing the development of a well-
formed overview of the key trends and issues affecting the organisation. 
At both the School and the NVO there was a feeling that the board received too much 
information.  In both cases one factor was that the full board received detailed 
information and reports from the various sub-committees they had established.  One 
reason for this, particularly at the School, was that board members feared they would not 
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be fulfilling their statutory duties and responsibilities if they ratified recommendations 
from sub-committees without full information. 
‘It didn’t really feel that we ought to be passing a policy without having the full policy 
documents available - passing it from the full governors’ meeting, even if a sub-
committee had looked into it and passed it.  Somebody said, `Well, no, if I’m as a 
governor, at the full meeting, putting my name to if, I want to see the whole policy.’ 
         [School governor] 
At the School the legal requirements and those of the local authority increased the load on 
the board.  This was possibly exacerbated by the Head’s style;he appeared anxious not to 
be leading the board too directly, which meant he often went over proposals in detail and 
tried always to present both sides of the argument: 
‘It’s always like the head has to go through it twice; he has to go through it with me and 
then present his report again there.  But .....  I feel I need to be on top of it’  
         [School governor] 
‘I’ve tried to be fair to them at all times and put both sides of things and options there.  
It’s for others to judge how fair that is, because it’s difficult to tell when you’re involved 
in it.......         [School head] 
The College revealed a variety of views on whether more or less information was needed, 
with a general consensus that there should be less volume but more tailored to the needs 
of the board.  In particular it was felt by some board members that they lacked good 
information on the College’s performance and on how this compared with other similar 
colleges: 
‘the area where we’re not getting enough information and we’re not knowing what’s 
happening is in the area of the College’s results, comparative success with other colleges 
and the measure of achievement.’ 
Contrary to the other cases, the board at the LVO had too little information if anything.  
There appeared to be a number of factors which influenced this.  The organisation itself 
lacked good management information systems, and there seemed a lack of understanding 
at least on the financial side among both board members and staff about what information 
the board should have.  One staff member commented on the financial information the 
board had: 
‘Basically the cash balances and where we are at with our money coming in and our 
spending of the money - that’s about it.  Beyond that they don’t know very much.  I have 
to say if I was one of them I would want to know more...’ 
Most other information tended to be given in the Director’s report which was often given 
verbally to the meeting.  Hence the board was very much dependent on the director in 
knowing what was going on. 
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Apart from formal board information there was evidence from all four cases that 
knowledge about the organisation which comes from the informal contacts and 
organisational access can enhance the effectiveness of board members.  At the School, 
conversations in the playground and in the local High St played an important part in 
keeping governors informed about issues, as did arrangements for governors to visit and 
take an interest in particular year groups.  At the NVO, member and volunteer 
involvement in operations, coupled with a tradition of collective working, meant that 
board members were amongst the best informed.  The Chair and CEO at the College were 
developing a range of ways of keeping board members informed about the College’s 
activities including: informal meetings between board members and senior and middle 
management, visits to sites and classes, and  linking  board members with particular 
expertise to informally mentor particular managers. 
Even at the LVO, where as we have already noted the CEO sought to ensure that there 
was little contact between board members and the rest of the staff outside meetings, some 
informal contact was important .  The informal relationship between one board member 
and the CEO was such that she acquired significant information about the management of 
the organisation beyond that contained in formal meeting papers.  Overall, however, the 
LVO board was probably the least well informed of the four. 
While informal contacts can enhance the performance of boards, there is obviously a 
danger that this, just as with formal information, can become excessive and lead to an 
over-emphasis on operational matters.  Overall, the evidence suggests it is difficult to 
identify what is the right level and amount of information.  There is permanent tension 
between too much and too little.  Board members will always have less information than 
managers about the issues they are considering, and thus there is an inevitable pressure 
for this deficit to be filled with more papers  Pressure can also come from management 
themselves, who may resent the board dealing with matters about which they know little.  
Opposing this is the danger that if board members are spending all their limited time 
reading papers and trying in vain to catch up with this information deficit, this will be at 
the expense of their thinking about the issues involved or becoming too bogged down in 
the detail.  One College board member seemed aware of this tension, and also of the 
constant need to review the quantity and quality of information received: 
‘it is very difficult to know, when a particular item comes up on the agenda, what sort of 
information should be there on the table for us as a basis on which to make our decision.’ 
6.4 Role and contribution 
Underlying the issue of how boards and managements relate to each other is the central 
question of what role boards play in organisational life.  The analysis of the four cases 
suggests there are tensions and ambiguities around the positions which boards occupy in 
organisations, and also that there are gaps between the espoused and actual contributions 
which boards make.  Below we consider the evidence from the cases about the role and 
contribution of boards in three main areas which relate to the models of governance 
introduced in Chapter 3. 
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The first discusses the role and contribution of the boards in relation to their stewardship 
of the organisation’s resources.  The second looks at the contribution which boards make 
to an organisation’s accountability to its stakeholders, reflecting the political, or 
representational, model of governance.  The third examines how boards contribute to the 
development of the strategy of an organisation, which derives from the managerial 
perspective on governance.  In particular this explores the tensions between strategic and 
operational levels of contribution. 
 Stewardship 
There are three main aspects to a board’s stewardship role of safeguarding the 
organisation’s resources and mission: ensuring the organisation has adequate policies, 
procedures and controls; monitoring the performance of the organisation; and appointing 
and holding senior management to account.  Many of the legal requirements on boards 
concern the stewardship of the organisation’s financial resources.  This aspect of 
stewardship is looked at in  more detail in Section 7. 
The boards of the public sector organisations differed from the two voluntary 
organisations in the problems they experienced in ensuring that the organisation had 
adequate policies, procedures and controls.  The College could rely on its professional 
staff to ensure that policies and procedures were drawn up covering matters such as 
health and safety, or personnel procedures.  In the School, although technically the 
responsibility of the Governors, the Head could draw on professional advice and guidance 
of the LEA.  This left the board with quite a limited ratifying and checking role. 
In small voluntary organisations developing adequate policies and procedures can be 
more problematic, as neither the staff nor the board may have the necessary expertise in 
the area concerned.  This can cause problems for the board.  At the NVO it was only 
when the board was in the process of taking disciplinary action against a member of staff, 
and the staff member brought in a union representative, that it realised its policies and 
procedures were not adequate. 
In terms of monitoring performance, board members saw this aspect of the stewardship 
role largely as contributing to the efficiency rather than the effectiveness of their 
organisations. 
‘The main purpose of the governor is to ensure that the School is run efficiently.’ 
‘I see [the role of the LVO board] as....the organisation is run as efficiently as possible, 
that the staff are supported, that the money is well spent and the best possible staff are 
appointed.’ 
‘I see myself very much as part of the College and what I’m interested in is that the 
College is run efficiently.’ 
In the NVO, there was a growing concern about the impact of different decisions upon the 
beneficiaries and social objectives of the organisation.  However, the difficulty of 
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evaluating the effectiveness of many of the organisation’s activities made it very difficult 
for the board or staff to act.  Even at the College board level systems for checking or 
contributing to service effectiveness were little developed at the time of the research. 
In terms of improving efficiency there was also a gap between the boards' perceived role 
and actual contribution.  In the School and LVO in particular, there was little evidence of 
the boards making any material difference to the way the organisations spent their money 
or organised their activities.  At the NVO, the collective tradition ensured that board 
members were involved in budget-setting and planning work, but  formal systems for 
evaluating efficiency or effectiveness were still weak.  At the College, the way the board 
developed the FEFC requirement for an audit function (see Section 7) were by far the 
most advanced of the four organisations. However, efforts to monitor and improve 
performance were hampered by the lack of comparative data with other Colleges. 
One incident at the School highlights the difficulties which boards face in actually 
playing a useful role as stewards for the quality  of the services which the organisation 
delivers.  Although there was recognition that the board helped in some service areas - 
such as allocating nursery places - when the board suggested it could help monitor the 
quality of teaching, the staff rejected this outright: it seemed out of the question that a 
bunch of lay governors could have anything useful to say about how the School taught its 
children.  Both staff and governors seemed to recognise that they in reality made little 
direct impact on the School’s services: 
‘If you’ve got a good Head, a good Deputy Head, good teaching staff, that has a hundred 
times more impact than whatever the governing body is like.’ 
‘I’ve read some of the introduction to governors’ booklets and stuff and .......it seems to 
me that they’re presenting something more than we actually do.  I think the School is, to a 
large extent, the Head and the Deputy, followed closely by the staff that’s there.......I 
don’t know enough to know how much we could change the direction or the ethos of the 
School. 
The obvious response to this is that if a board has to leave it to the senior management to 
make a difference, then its role in appointing and monitoring them can be the vehicle 
through which they can most effectively be stewards for the organisation.  Even in the 
LVO and the School, where the board were less powerful they were a check on the power 
of management: 
‘[We could] stop him becoming too powerful and the rest of it, I suppose .....  making 
them think twice before they actually do something.  ’ 
‘We are a check and balance for the School and I do think the support we provide makes 
a difference.’        [School governors] 
As Wood (1992) has suggested, the board is also an added safeguard able to take over in 
the event of a crisis or failure of management.  More positively the board may play a role 
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by subjecting management’s proposals to critical questioning and scrutiny.  This role had 
most clearly been developed by the College board: 
‘We’re far more proactive, we’re asking an awful lot of questions... the staff now expects 
us to ask questions and be critical and want to know why we’re doing it and how we’re 
doing it and see how it fits with the pattern.  We’re taking a fair amount of advice from 
outside and we’re also feeding back from our own organisations..’ 
Accountability 
The idea that board members are there to represent the interests of stakeholders and be 
accountable for the organisation to them raises the question: who are the stakeholders and 
how is accountability exercised? 
For schools the DfEE (1996a) guidance to schools provides a useful starting point: 
‘Governing bodies are accountable to those who established the School and also to 
parents and the wider community for the way in which it carries out its functions.’ 
However the guidance is clear that accountability is not of the mandated kind: 
‘although [governors] are not delegates, the governing body reflects the community it 
serves’ 
‘Reflect’ was a word which also arose frequently in the LVO and College interviews.  
However its meaning is ambiguous.  At the School and the LVO it seemed to mean that 
there should be some consistency between the stakeholder composition of the board and 
the stakeholder composition of the communities in which the organisation operates, but 
not that board members should necessarily reflect the views of the stakeholders they are 
from.  In the LVO, this was the local community of funding, supporting and partner 
organisations, not the service users.  There was a concern in the NVO that male and 
female members and members from different regions be represented as directors, 
although in reality this was difficult to achieve.  However, at the College the idea that the 
board should reflect the community did not influence selection greatly: 
‘Members have not been chosen to mirror the local community but on their ability to ask 
searching questions and face the difficult choices head on.’ 
The boards of the two educational organisations felt the strongest sense of them being a 
bridge between the organisation and the local community:  
‘I know that the School does have a lot of links with the community, anyway, in its daily 
function.  But it’s almost like ....the School accepting that its responsible to the 
community.  That’s it’ got local governors there who are evaluating what they’re doing 
and monitoring what they’re doing and that they have a responsibility to the local 
community.’         [School governor] 
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‘The Corporation is the mechanism for bringing together the multiple accountabilities of 
the College to the local community but it’s yet to develop...it’s monitoring of the overall 
local educational impact of what we do.’   [College board members] 
This last point highlights the gap between perceiving that the board as the vehicle for 
accountability and putting this into effect.  It  could be argued that the fact that the four 
boards existed and operated was sufficient to make the organisations feel more 
accountable to (and part of) the various communities they served.  Yet none of the boards 
had thought very deeply about how they could act as the body which brought stakeholder 
interests and expectations to the organisation, or which brought the organisation to the 
stakeholders.  Apart from annual reports and meetings, there were few mechanisms for 
accounting to stakeholders.  Only the NVO had a newsletter which went to members.  At 
the School and NVO, board members would also on occasions act as representatives and 
take up the concerns of an individual parent or member 
In theory, each of the organisations’ managements could have developed non-board 
mechanisms for ascertaining stakeholder concerns and reporting to them.  Perhaps the 
existence of boards  meant that management did not give a high priority to issues of 
stakeholder consultation and involvement:if the board is there, why is there a  need ?  
There is a paradox here.  Boards do provide one vehicle for accountability, but may 
relieve manage from the responsibility of addressing this issue in other ways. 
Contribution to strategy 
Both the stewardship and accountability functions of governance involve the board’s 
arms-length relationship with management: how they check management and how they 
hold management to account.  The perspective in this section is different: it looks at how 
governance can add value to organisational performance.  Much of the American 
literature and influence on the governance function has come from this perspective, 
arguing that non-profit boards can make a real difference to organisational performance 
(Carver 1990).  The particular emphasis is on boards as the apex of the organisation, Thus 
they are the obvious location for strategy setting and review, with managers left to 
operational management.  At least in theory, many of the those interviewed in all four 
cases supported this view of the board:  
‘...not day to day decisions, but I think the long-term decisions that affect the nature and 
style of the College, I think this is a role for the board.’ 
        [College board member] 
However, in practice this distinction between strategy or policy and operational matters 
was difficult for boards and managers to maintain, for two sets of reasons. The first 
related to the resources which boards are able to bring to strategic role.  They were 
constrained by time, lack of knowledge of the organisations and sometimes, particularly 
in the smaller organisations, lack of expertise.  In general there was a recognition that 
they were largely dependent of management to formulate strategic proposals and options 
even if they had a clear input into this process. 
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The second related to the difficulty of separating strategic and operational matters, which 
was an issue in all four cases: 
‘It isn’t a very neat or clear separation between policy formulation and execution 
because I think the fact has to be faced that on certain levels of execution, the Board 
members have a lot of experience which is relevant, so they will contribute their ideas 
and perhaps expect staff will take them up...and of course in day to day operations the 
staff will often formulate policy suggestions which the board will then give due weight to 
...’         [NVO board member] 
‘they are the overall governing body of the School in terms of the overall main policies 
and functions of the School, whereas differing from the management and the day-to-day 
running of the School, which is my responsibility.  However, unfortunately in the realms 
of education, that’s often blurred and the dividing line between them is difficult to define 
and from my experience each governing body takes on a slightly different mode and 
interprets that in slightly different ways.  That clouds the issue...’ 
          [School head] 
There was also a suggestion that it took board members time to gain the experience and 
confidence necessary to begin to tackle this strategic role: 
‘As governors get further into their term of office that they then tend to back off and look 
for overall policy and governance of the School, and back off the day-to-day things.’ 
          [School head] 
Without devaluing the contributions made by board members on operational matters, 
there seemed to be a general pattern that where the organisation failed to define or 
develop clear roles for their boards (be they strategic or stewardship or accountability 
roles) then boards drifted into detailed operational interventions, almost by default. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, given its size and the background of many of its governors, it 
was the College board that had most developed its strategic role.  It was the body which 
asked the strategic questions and held managers to account for strategic performance.  It 
did this partly through the mechanism of away days, and special small strategic planning 
groups of senior board members and managers.  But perhaps most powerfully, it 
contributed to the strategic direction of the College by knowing what questions to ask, 
when and of whom, because of their experience at strategy level in other organisations. 
It may be unrealistic for the boards of local Schools or small voluntary organisations to 
try to mimic the strategic contributions which boards can make in larger organisations.  
They cannot always attract members with the appropriate expertise.  In other words, 
whilst the capacity of a board to challenge and contribute to management may be a 
desirable objective for governance in general - and exciting to observe when it happens -  
if it comes from a board with little expertise in management or strategy and possessing 
limited intervention experience, then it is unlikely to do the organisation much good.  For 
small organisations such as Schools, which are quite tightly regulated, the range of 
  54 
strategic options may be so limited that strategic management is also less important.  This 
does not mean there is no contribution which boards can make to the management of 
organisations. 
In the LVO, we observed the mentoring contribution made by one board member to the 
senior manager, and the generally supportive backstop role played, which was highly 
valued by the management.  At the NVO we observed genuine involvement in priority 
setting by board members, and helping staff to think through strategic issues, even if there 
was a strong tendency toward operational drift. 
6.5 Conclusions 
The conclusions which follow first summarise the major findings relating to board-
management relationships, and second suggest some implications for practice. 
Findings 
• It is far easier for managers than for boards to exercise real power in non-profit and 
public organisations, because of their operational knowledge, professional expertise, 
and control of information and agendas for meetings.  The two principal conditions 
for boards to exercise power seem to be, first,  that the board contains competent and 
experienced members, and second, that management welcomes and/or expects boards 
to be powerful. 
• Lack of clarity about the distinctive role of boards, coupled with operational and 
regulatory demands and the desire of those reporting to the board to justify their 
decisions, can lead boards into a process of operational drift.  However, it is possible 
to enhance the usefulness of meetings by developing members’ intervention skills, 
organising and prioritising agendas and providing more leadership at meetings. 
• There is a permanent tension between board members having too much and too little 
information to be effective, both of which can hamper effective governance.  Informal 
sources of information - access to the organisations staff and operations, 
conversations outside of meetings - can be an valuable means of keeping board 
members informed about the organisation. 
• How effectively boards carry out their stewardship function varies widely, depending 
in part upon the balance of power between managers and board members, the 
expertise of the board, and the systems and procedures the organisation has developed 
for monitoring performance.  However, even apparently weak boards can still serve as 
a check and balance on managerial power and as a source of legitimacy. 
• The role of boards in ensuring accountability to an organisation’s stakeholders is 
generally undeveloped, but still valued by board members and managers.  However, 
the existence of boards may inhibit the development of other accountability 
mechanisms  
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• The ability of boards to play a more strategic role is often limited by lack of time and 
expertise and the difficulty of isolating strategic from operational matters.  However, 
deliberately setting aside time at regular intervals to review strategy, away from the 
routine business of board meetings, and careful attention to agenda setting, can help 
boards keep a strategic focus 
• Apparently excessive attention to operational matters does not necessarily mean that 
governance serves no useful purpose.  There is a safeguard in having a board, separate 
from management, who have some knowledge of and commitment to the 
organisation.  They may also add value in other ways, for example: supporting 
management, helping to legitimise difficult decisions, and acting as a link with 
important stakeholders. 
• Most organisations are not clear about the respective roles of board members and 
managers in their organisations and the contribution they expect boards to make.  This 
can lead to an under-utilisation of boards by managers, and conflict as each side 
perceives the other to be encroaching on their territory. 
Implications for practice 
(1) Board members and senior managers need to periodically assess the roles the 
board plays and could play in the organisation. 
Different roles will be appropriate to different boards, depending on the circumstances 
they face and the expertise and time they have available.  Boards which do not try to 
relate roles to their capacities relationships and circumstances are likely to be more 
confused and ineffective in the roles that they take on.  They may even be a burden rather 
then a benefit to the organisation.  This can reveal itself in frustration with meetings, 
excessive operational drift and conflict.  The opportunity of a new chair, CEO or change 
in the external environment may be the prompt for a board to review and change its role.  
It will take time to develop new or stronger roles - be they in stewardship, accountability 
or strategic management - and there will be tensions in the process.  There will also be 
problems if the roles adopted do not fit the skills or ideologies of members.   
(2) Senior managers need to regularly review with boards whether they have the 
right information to meet their needs, and how they can best be kept 
informed of the work of the organisation. 
Such a review needs to consider whether the information provided relates to the adopted 
role and priorities of the board; whether too little is preventing board members from 
being properly informed; or whether too much is hampering there ability to identify what 
are the significant issues.  The review should also consider whether other informal means 
of finding out about the organisation are required, such as site visits, informal meetings, 
or links with other members of staff.  These more informal means of keeping in touch 
were highly valued in a number of the cases, and appeared to help board members make 
better informed decisions. 
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(3) A high priority needs to be given to the organisation and servicing of board 
meetings, and the development of board members meeting skills. 
Common problems among the boards observed included: overlong unstructured agendas, 
duplication of work undertaken in sub-committees, excessive attention to detail, and lack 
of prioritisation.  These problems could all be reduced by more proactive leadership and 
chairing from both the CEOs and Chairs, and more attention being paid to the way 
agendas are structured and meetings are serviced.  The development of board members 
skills in intervening, reporting and questioning at meetings can also enhance the value of 
governance meetings. This recommendation relates to those in Section 5 on board 
development.  Chairs and CEOs would benefit from training material on, for instance: 
- identifying and balancing ‘report-only’ and ‘discussion’ items 
- planning, allocating and keeping to specific time limits for different agenda 
 items 
- one pro-active development of agendas which balance operational reports  with 
consideration of strategic performance issues 
All board members could benefit from training in process skills, for instance video 
material showing examples of effective and ineffective interventions in board meetings. 
(4) Board members need to consider what contribution they can usefully make 
outside board meetings 
There are a range of contributions board members can make to organisations.  It is even 
possible to be a valued board member and never attend meetings.  Contributions evident 
in the cases include: staff appointments, informal advice and mentoring to senior 
managers, shadowing particular managers or functions, sitting on special task forces. 
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(7) Boards’ contribution to financial management 
This chapter addresses three broad areas of board intervention in financial issues.  The 
first is financial monitoring, which concerns whether and how boards receive and 
respond to information about performance against budget, and budget forecasts.  The 
second concerns financial procedures: whether and how boards ensure that proper and 
effective procedures exist in organisations for the control and management of income and 
expenditure.  The third we label financial management, which is concerned with whether 
and how boards contribute to resource generation and utilisation to and financial strategy 
formulation.  The three areas are linked: procedures facilitate monitoring, which in turn 
relates to the achievement of strategic financial objectives. 
Whilst these concerns are central to all organisations, two dimensions in public and non-
profit organisations render all three of them more complex and possibly more important, 
with consequent implications for governance.  The first concerns accountability.  In for-
profit organisations, most income is provided by the customer, whose interest in what the 
organisation does with their money after their purchase is virtually non-existent.   In 
public and non-profit organisations however, most income is received from public or 
voluntary sources in the expectation that certain non-financial public and/or social goals 
will be attained.  The board thus has a greater stewardship function, being accountable as 
agent (or trustee) to those who provide the organisation’s income, and to the public either 
because of public funding or because of the tax concessions which charities receive.  This 
accountability pervades the legal and accounting regulations governing public and non-
profit organisations, and is encapsulated by the government minister, Baroness Blatch, 
when explaining the need for the new accounting regulations of the 1993 Charities Act: 
‘Openness and accountability are the vital ingredients needed to foster and maintain 
public confidence in the charity sector.  Everyone - the public, donors and beneficiaries - 
increasingly demands to know how much money is being spent.  Charities are responsible 
for the public money which they receive and must be able to provide a clear picture of 
how resources are being used.’     (NGO Finance 1995) 
A second dimension concerns the difficulty of measuring the best use of resources.  
Whilst businesses may have ancillary objectives, their boards have a predominant and 
unifying concern to maximise the financial returns on the available resources.  However, 
in public and non-profit organisations, what constitutes the optimal use of financial 
resources is inherently subjective.  Effectiveness in utilising resources can be measured 
against a wide range of contested, social, and hard-to-quantify criteria.  Different 
stakeholders represented on the board may have different perceptions of what constitutes 
the best use of resources.  
7.1 Financial monitoring 
At a basic level, all four organisations presented information to their boards which 
enabled board members to : 
  58 
(a) compare actual income and expenditure against budget headings 
(b) consider projected sources and levels of income and expenditure 
The information presented in all four organisations derived from an accounting tradition 
of preparing annual budgets (in response to the funding and regulatory environment) and 
then monitoring expenditure against them.  None of the organisations routinely 
considered information about the organisations’ financial  assets or asset utilisation.  The 
emphasis in financial monitoring was on compliance with regulations - ‘keeping out of 
trouble’ - and not on identifying and tracking selected key financial benchmarks of 
organisational performance. 
Beyond this common emphasis and capacity to present budgets and forecasts, the four 
cases revealed four different models of boards’ involvement with financial monitoring, 
characterised below as Involving, Explaining, Trusting and Questioning. 
Involved financial monitoring 
At the NVO, a Finance Sub Committee (FSC) consisting of two Board members, two 
staff and a co-opted adviser with accounting skills met twice a year to receive and 
consider management accounts.  In addition, the FSC Chair was sent monthly 
management accounts.  The information was book-keeping based - full of budget codes - 
and consequently other board members had difficulty in grasping messages in it.  
However the Chair and to a lesser extent other members of the small FSC appeared to 
understand the information presented and its implications and would become involved in 
detailed and informed discussions about it.  In this sense, board members were 
monitoring the organisation’s finances and thus performing the basic financial 
stewardship function.  
Three observations may be relevant in this case.  First, the FSC Chair had been involved 
with the organisation for many years (a board member for four) and his familiarity with 
its cost structure and financial patterns meant that he was generally on top of the 
information presented.  Secondly, uniquely across the four cases, the board (through the 
FSC) was actively involved in the budget-setting process (see Financial Management 
below).  This helped the FSC to develop a sense of ownership of the management 
accounts presented for discussion.  A downside of this was that the FSC tended to get 
involved in very detailed and time-consuming financial monitoring at its meetings.  A 
third factor was the contribution of a co-opted financial adviser, whose professional 
expertise may have added to the credibility and confidence of the FSC. 
Board involvement with an organisation’s finances do not guarantee that they add value 
in their stewardship function.  At the NVO, there was no extraction of key financial 
performance indicators in the information presented, and little attention was yet being 
paid to longer term financial planning.  The FSC largely reacted to financial information 
and spent little time using accounts to think creatively or differently about the income or 
cost structure of the organisation.  This reactive emphasis was common to all four cases. 
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An emphasis upon explanation 
At the School, commendably clear management accounts and budget forecasts were 
presented termly to the Premises and Finance Committee (PFC), and also considered by 
the termly full Governing Body.  As with the NVO, consideration of the management 
accounts was largely reactive, historical and operationally biased.  A key difference to the 
NVO was in the gap between the management’s (i.e.  the Head’s) and the board 
members’ capacity to understand and interpret financial information.  As a parent-
governor reported: 
‘it’s difficult for us to manage things as we don’t really understand what’s going on.’ 
We observed that the main focus of financial monitoring was a painstaking effort to get 
board members to comprehend the information, constantly thinking of ways of presenting 
information as simply and clearly as possible in response to members’ fear of figures: 
‘[the information] is adequate in as much as it tells you what’s going on.  And the notes 
that [the Head] produces are very helpful.  But it’s not adequate for those who don’t 
understand it.  It could, I suppose, be presented in a simpler form, but then that requires 
somebody to spend time doing it ...you ought to be talked through it.  People who aren’t 
familiar with figures, I think it’s a nightmare for them.  So they won’t understand it, so 
they might as well put it in a simplified way.     [staff governor] 
‘....I must admit, in financial terms quite a few of them have difficulty with some of the 
language which is used and bearing in mind that I’ve had to learn it myself and am not 
totally sure either, some of them are off-put by that! Some will not volunteer to sit on the 
finance committee.’        [Head teacher] 
There was a  concern to develop board members’  understanding of financial matters, in 
recognition that they were in some way disempowered by their ignorance  The extent to 
which boards have a duty to educate all their members in financial matters needs to be 
balanced with the risk that all information is presented in basic, lowest common 
denominator format.  It may be that board members need to allocate their financial 
monitoring responsibilities between them according to their capacity to comprehend, or to 
develop a comprehension of, financial information 
‘I’m no wiz for/with figures, that’s true.  And I’ve steered clear of enrolling on the 
Financial Sub-committee, because maths and me don’t go together.’ 
‘I think I’m just beginning to work out where all the money comes from ......I wouldn’t 
feel capable of taking the minutes of Finance because I wouldn’t quite know which 
important points to pull out.’      [lay governors] 
The board’s capacity to perform the financial monitoring function appeared to depend 
upon the expertise of members: 
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‘At one point a previous governing body ....actually went out and recruited the previous 
Chair of Finance, who was an accountant somewhere.  I found it quite interesting 
working with him, because he wanted to know even less about what was going on the 
day-to-day basis of the finance.  He was only interested in overall figures.  That took me 
a while to come to terms with, because I thought here was somebody who was going to be 
here every day looking at the figures.  He really didn’t want to know.  As long as things 
were within performance indicators of particular percentage terms, he felt that was 
fine.....  It’s that sort of experience that I have to lead others into now.  And I’ve learnt 
from him in that respect.' 
The overall result of this ‘expertise deficit’ was to reduce the monitoring function to the 
explanation of the expenditure report, with a minor rubber stamping role: 
‘Basically, [we] were just given a run-down of what the expenditures were and what was 
spent where and just sort of look at it and agree it.  [The Head]explained how he’d come 
to those figures and where he’d juggled a few and asked if we approved.’ 
This assessment needs to be tempered with an appreciation of the limited room for 
financial manoeuvre which funding and regulation give to small schools.  This does act as 
a pressure to limit their financial role to a minimalist stewardship one. 
Another pressure is the fear of challenging the CEO.  The only school governor with the 
capacity to understand the information had not been involved with the school for long and 
was wary of appearing to challenge the Head’s authority by questioning the accounts 
presented.  The school was located in a tradition whereby the LEA was the principal body 
to whom the Head reported financial information.  It had been from them that he expected 
to receive advice and guidance.  The governing body had been seen as parent, community 
and political representatives who were not expected to do more than appreciate their 
formal financial responsibilities.  The pattern was much more one of the Head explaining 
the management accounts to the Board.  Our observation of the practice of financial 
monitoring in the school contrasted with the PFC chair’s assertion of what he saw  his 
role ought to be in PFC meetings: 
‘...making sure that ...I understand every point that comes up and the implications of it, 
trying to draw out information, questions or queries from other members of the 
committee and, yes, taking any follow-on action that needs to be done.’ 
Nonetheless, the formal requirement to produce and explain management accounts and 
budgets for the Board did impose a structure and discipline to financial accountability at 
the School.  Without this, the only such structure and discipline would have existed 
through (a) the reporting relationship to the Local Education Authority, inherently more 
distanced and formal and (b) the annual audit function (again via the LEA), inherently 
more limited in scope and currency. 
  61 
‘Blind trust’ 
At the LVO reliance upon the financial knowledge and expertise of particular individuals 
also featured prominently.  Internal financial systems were very undeveloped, with the 
organisation running on what the finance officer described as “a rather blind trust” in 
her.  The Finance Officer, senior managers and one board member appeared to know 
what was going on in the organisation independently and almost despite the formal 
presentation of management accounts to the Board.  Such accounts as were presented 
were not always sent out in advance, did not feature comparisons with previous 
accounting periods and were rarely discussed in detail at meetings.  The Finance Officer 
was asked what information the Board asked of her: 
‘Basically the cash balances and where we are at with our money coming in and our 
spending of money.  Beyond that, they don’t know very much.  I have to say, if I was one 
of them, I’d want to know more but they aren’t very finance oriented.’ 
Board members were conscious that the Charities Act imposed a duty of financial 
scrutiny on them and they felt that they had sufficient information to carry out that role, 
but most admitted that they were not skilled or really interested in it.  Financial issues 
were seen as a formal accountability requirement of governance rather than a means of 
adding value to the organisation.  The emphasis was on complying with what they were 
required to do by law, rather the seeing these external impositions as being something 
which could contribute to the good management of the organisation. 
It is perhaps noteworthy that the organisation had a history whereby the current CEO had 
long ago felt that collective decision-making had damaged the organisation and that clear 
and structured management responsibilities should exist.  This had perhaps spilled over 
into seeing the board not as  a source of debate or control, but as a formal rubber-
stamping body, occasionally useful for their contacts. 
Questioning experts 
At the College, we observed paradoxically both the most effective financial monitoring 
and also the most criticism of current financial monitoring practice.  The effectiveness 
was due largely to two factors: expertise and relationships.  
The financial expertise of both the managers and the Board Members who attended the 
Finance and General Purposes Committee (FGPC) was in a different league to the other 
three organisations, as perhaps befits its relative size and budget.  The two senior 
managers who attended FGPC to present and respond to questions about the detailed and 
clear management accounts and budget forecasts (sent out well in advance of meetings) 
were respectively a CIPFA accountant and an experienced senior college administrator.  
The Board Members on the FGPC included a Chartered Accountant in private practice, a 
management accountant working in industry, as well as other senior managers with 
experience of receiving, interpreting and acting upon complex financial information. 
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Little time was spent in explaining the accounts line by line, as was the case at the 
School.  
The relationships between managers and board members were also such that it was 
expected that there would be rigorous and if appropriate critical questioning of 
management accounts by Board Members.  Managers felt that such challenge enhanced 
the financial monitoring function in the organisation by adding expertise, perspective and 
ideas wider than those present in the management; it was not necessarily an interference 
in managers’ work.  As the CEO said: 
‘The Corporation do have a responsibility for the current viability of the business....they 
have to receive information at the FGPC that convinces them that we are still on track 
with this year’s budget.’ 
The overall result at the college was an FGPC where key variances were picked up 
instantly and probed until both fully explained and action agreed.  This role had very 
much developed since incorporation, at which point the Local Education Authority had 
lost its financial responsibility.  This compares with the school, where the LEA retained 
its formal responsibility. 
The criticism of existing financial monitoring practice came from both Board Members 
and managers, and essentially concerned the need for qualitative rather than quantitative 
financial information: 
‘For donkeys’ years, I’ve said don’t tell us we’re spending too much money.  Tell us how 
much money we’re spending , why we’re spending it, where’s it going and why we need 
to count that, where we need to count that, and give us some figures!’ 
‘They’ve got to be given key data, which will enable them to have more perspective about 
the college’s financial position and make decisions about the right way forward rather 
than looking at petty detail...maybe what they should be looking at is not the 30 [budget] 
lines, but what the bottom line says in terms of the overall position.’ 
        [Independent board 
members] 
There was a common concern for continuous improvement in financial monitoring : less 
of the swamping operational detail, and more and faster highlighting of key performance 
variations. 
7.2 Financial Procedures 
Boards have formal responsibilities for the propriety of financial control procedures in the 
organisations researched, as part of their public accountability for the monies they 
receive.  Relevant government guidance for schools and colleges, and to a  lesser extent 
Charity Commission and accounting regulations for charities, specify how this 
responsibility is to be enacted at board level.  In addition, the organisations themselves 
have an interest in the efficiency and effectiveness of the procedures by which income 
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and expenditure is managed.  Together, these external and internal pressures both mean 
that boards have some responsibility for ensuring that procedures are in place which 
ensure propriety and efficiency. 
In the School, there was an annual audit of procedures carried out at the instigation of the 
LEA, which still officially controlled the school.  This statutory professional audit yielded 
a report in a standard structure which was supplied to governors for their formal 
consideration.  Governors saw this more as a responsibility of the LEA, in conjunction 
with the Head, than as being something that they needed to be involved in.  This in part 
reflected their limited expertise in such matters but also their trust of both the LEA and 
the Head  
‘Well we do have the Auditor’s report, from of course the County.  Which we went 
through and asked questions about.  But then [the Head]would have gone through and 
sorted out how he’s going to remedy it.  I think on the financial side he’s very good.  I 
think with what they’ve got to manage with, I think he does a very, very good job.  
In the NVO, there were formal procedural arrangements such as the amounts of 
expenditure which staff were allowed to authorise without formal sub-committee or board 
approval.  However the Board had not developed either an Audit Committee nor any 
internal audit function.  It is likely any proposal to do so would have met with questions 
about its relative costs and benefits.  
The formal requirement of the FEFC for colleges to have an Audit Committee with 
specified responsibilities was developed further by the College.  This resulted in a process 
which demanded and acted upon detailed reports on a huge range of cash handling and 
financial management procedures.  These reports were  prepared by internal auditors from 
an independent firm of Chartered Accountants and were presented and re-presented to 
Audit Committee until management could prove they had been acted upon in full: 
‘If there are deficiencies, then we [the Audit Committee] come up with an agreed 
programme of how we’re going to address them.’ [Audit Committee member] 
Our observation of the Audit Committee suggested that it was effective in ensuring 
proper, efficient and effective financial procedures for several reasons: 
• the expertise of the two board members on the Audit Committee, one an accountant 
and both with a tenacious appetite for detail and for seeing things through; 
• the availability and experience of the internal auditors in preparing the reports, 
especially as they could draw upon best practice in other colleges and organisations; 
• the willingness of the Committee to commission, or adapt the remit of, reports to 
meet specific concerns in the organisations (e.g.  one report was commissioned on the 
cost-effectiveness of the College’s marketing section). 
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At the LVO, the finance officer was critical of the lack of internal financial safeguards in 
the organisation, and of the ‘ad hoc’ basis on which decisions were put to the Board or 
not.  There appeared to be no criteria for what was and was not board level financial 
decision-making, nor for what spending authority different levels of management had.  
There appeared to be no role played by the Board regarding financial procedures beyond 
the formal responsibility for the annual audit. 
It is difficult to envisage the three smaller organisations adopting the sort of audit 
function practised at the College, due to their size and the lack of a statutory requirement.  
However it was noteworthy that none of the other three boards had considered any scaled 
down form of internal audit, or Audit Committee, as a resource through which boards 
could foster best practice, hold management to account, and channel members’ expertise.  
The cost/benefit equation probably explains this; even where audit worked, at the college, 
senior managers complained that the input it required from them, on top of all the other 
requirements of the regulatory regime, was excessive.  
There is also a danger of pigeon-holing board members with, for example, accountancy 
expertise into a checking role: other contributions they could make to the organisation can 
be lost; and they can end up being the only board members understanding what goes on. 
7.3 Financial Management 
If both financial monitoring and procedures stem from the stewardship model of 
governance, then financial management stems from the managerial model whereby 
boards are viewed as a performance-enhancing layer in the organisation.  Obviously, 
effective financial management requires both effective financial information and 
procedures, and the boundaries between the three categories are inevitably somewhat 
arbitrary.  Nonetheless it is possible for an organisation to neatly and honestly record, 
check and report all its financial dealings and simultaneously fail to put its resources to 
best use in achieving the outcomes which the organisation exists to further.  
This ‘best use’, or resource optimisation, aspect of governance is important if boards are 
viewed as the trustees of an organisation’s mission, in which case it is the board’s 
function to ensure that resources are effectively converted into outcomes.  Put simply, do 
boards help organisations to generate any more resources, and to use them more 
efficiently and effectively in achieving organisational objectives, than they would do if 
the boards did not exist? 
Limited horizons 
The cases suggest that this question makes an assumption about board role which is not 
universally shared.  Different organisational and regulatory traditions result in very 
different perceptions of the role of governance.  A minimalist role, as far as financial 
management is concerned, was evident at the School, as seen in the following quotes by 
school governors: 
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‘[The Head] knows what is required - what the school requires - and it’s just a matter of 
jiggling the figures really, making sure we’ve got the money there to do it.  We’ve got to 
say, ‘Well, last year we spent a lot of money on library books, this year we really must 
have the paint work done.’ 
‘Well, if you look at the budgets...  there is not much to play with, really.  I suppose 
staffing levels we could be influential in, but I really don’t think we can or could, really, 
when it gets down to it.  And that’s the biggest bill.  Supply [teaching]: I suppose in the 
past we’ve discussed and made decisions more on the supply budget, but ultimately 
you’ve got not much control over that.  What’s left after we’ve allowed [for staff costs] is 
about £5,000 a week.  Fiddle around with all the repairs and the rest of it, the rest has to 
happen.  Welfare, the teachers, there’s a welfare system, we did something on welfare 
hours, but it’s very small when you look at it overall.  I don’t see it changing.’ 
These quotations reflect a general lack of involvement, by boards in all four 
organisations, in strategic financial management.  The reasons varied.  In the school, there 
was not much room in a tight budget, allocated through a precise government formula, for 
the board to be strategic with.  This was compounded by the lack of expertise and 
confidence discussed earlier, and the fear of trespassing upon the Head’s professional 
terrain.  In the LVO, it was not within the institutional culture for board members to 
understand or ‘interfere’ with such matters.  
In the NVO, the work involved in budget preparation and monitoring tended to squeeze 
out other aspects of financial management.  There were few major questions asked about 
the relative cost-effectiveness of different aspects of the organisation, perhaps because 
some of the options might have involved staff cuts, which was a very sensitive area in the 
organisation.  The NVO was also cushioned by reserves from the past. 
At the College, the horizons of both board members and senior managers were expanding 
to incorporate  matters of financial strategy.  However, the traditions of Local Education 
Authority accounting, combined with the demands of the FEFC regulatory regime, were 
possible obstacles to its development. 
Within this overall picture, there were significant variations between the cases.  Two 
levels of potential and actual board-level financial management contribution could be 
identified: budget construction and input/outcome conversion. 
Budget construction 
On the income side, budgets in public and non-profit organisations in theory involve 
researching sources of income and setting targets for what to try and obtain from where. 
On the expenditure side, in theory it involves research into the results produced by 
different activities, sections and functions and a consequent allocation of resources for the 
coming year (or beyond). In practice what income is received and how it is spent tends to 
be more prescribed in the public sector.  
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The budget construction process can be seen as a strategic function, in which boards, free 
from the detail of operational management, can identify overall organisational priorities.  
This could involve boards in setting their managements the questions and research agenda 
in advance, and then making informed, perhaps difficult, choices between different 
priorities. 
In practice, the budget construction processes were more mundane.  At the LVO, the 
Finance Officer presented the coming year’s budget, based on known adjustments to the 
currents year’s, to the Finance Sub-committee.  The process was treated at the full board 
thus: 
We are happy to approve [the budget] if the sub-committee went through it in depth - I’m 
sure you did.’        [Chair - at meeting] 
Although such non-duplication of the sub-committee’s work may be commendable, it 
was interesting that was no presentation to the full Committee of the significance of the 
coming year’s budget - differences, key headings, assumptions, implications, etc. - at a 
time when in fact the organisation was in a severe cash flow crisis with major changes to 
existing funding procedures in prospect.  Such discussion as there was about the budget 
concerned reactions to minor increases in stationery allowances and other minor budget 
headings. 
The School faced difficult choices in a period of cutbacks in government finance, and 
there was evidence of some strategic objective in the budgeting process, but in reality the 
process was performed by the Head and driven by the legal framework and the previous 
year: 
‘I think what we try to do is to try and build in a contingency for the future, really.  Try to 
safeguard against future cuts.  That’s been the priority.  To try and make sure that we are 
managing it so that we’re not going into the red.  We’re not supposed to go into the red, 
anyway, are we? To keep a balanced budget, so we’re not having a nervous Head at the 
end of the year, realising that with cuts, the overspend becomes even more significant’.   
       [Finance sub-committee chair] 
‘...But as a whole, certainly in financial terms, they are more than happy, or appear to 
be, to leave [the Head] to run within the affairs and delegation and so on.  And the time 
when they get more involved is ....the beginning of the year in terms of the options that 
might be involved in expenditure, rather than the day-to-day management of it......Our 
major issues is an ongoing one from year to year at the moment, making that financial 
plan balance and the decisions that have to go into that and the options involved.  And 
some of those have been quite difficult for [board members] , because they recognise that 
it actually affects their children and they can’t stand back from that.  We managed to do 
that almost painlessly last year, but that’s having made lots of savings in the previous 
financial year to create a surplus to carry forward.  And they’re not fully aware of the 
impact of some of those cuts.  They are aware of the point when it comes to seeing what 
options are left for them in that respect.’   [Head] 
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At the College, the budget construction process was ongoing through the year, with board 
members demanding, and getting, long-term financial scenarios based on different 
funding conditions and performance variables.  By asking awkward strategic questions, 
the board could be said to be enhancing the budget setting process.  It was not clear, 
however, if any of the board members sufficiently understood the intricacies of FEFC 
funding formula to grasp the meanings of the different scenarios. 
Only at the NVO were board members actively involved in budget construction as a 
mainstream annual agenda item, with a dedicated FSC meeting and board discussion 
allocated for the purpose.  The process was essentially target-setting, rather than the 
weighing up of strategic options informed by the appropriate information.  There was, 
however, real evidence of both comprehension of the budget detail and board ownership 
of the resulting budget.  Board members did also try to prioritise - indicating which 
proposals would have to come back for further approval depending on the financial 
position.  Strategic questions, including possible staff cut-backs, were beginning to be 
raised.  It was not clear whether the value this process added was more to the legitimacy 
of the process than to the quality of the budget. 
Input/outcome conversion 
The difficulty with this level of financial management is the issue of contested 
organisational objectives.  The one organisation which was beginning to operate on the 
level of matching resources to outputs and outcomes, the College, was perhaps the most 
divided in terms of a shared board understanding of organisational purpose.  This was 
likely to generate future conflicts between those seeing the College primarily as a 
business and those viewing it as a service to local communities.  A presently workable 
compromise existed, encapsulated by this quote: 
‘[the College] is there  to produce money that we can then re-invest to provide a greater 
degree of education in the community’ 
Notwithstanding these differences, there was a consensus that the discipline of 
management accounting, as opposed to financial accounting, could be put to use in 
improving the performance of different parts of the College: 
‘I would like to see the high level numbers, which we’ve never been presented with 
because the information hasn’t been available up to now.  ...I’m not interested in the nitty 
gritty detail, but what I would like to know is.....what it is costing to run the faculty, what 
number of students are there for the amount of money that we are spending.....the results 
of those faculties in terms of educational achievements and what their view is what 
resources they are going to need for the next few years....It’s the very high level 
indicators as far as I’m concerned.’ 
This quotation, mirrored in other interviews with both board members and managers, 
illustrates a thirst for a real understanding of the cost structure of the organisation, in 
order to contribute more to linking inputs with outputs and outcomes.  It was often 
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accompanied by a desire to compare such information with other colleges, and act 
accordingly. 
At the LVO, the figures which were presented would not have allowed the committee to 
examine whether the organisation was being cost-effective in the provision of its main 
services and there was no means of looking at comparative costings with other similar 
UK  organisations.  When the LVO Finance Officer’s reported the cashflow crisis which 
in her view merited serious board-level attention, all she felt she received from the Board 
was expressed in the comment: ‘Well, keep us informed.’  
At the School, the presence in the recent past of an accountant on the board had opened 
up the door slightly to the use of financial information as a tool in board level 
performance management.  However, the confused thinking about what to do next, and 
how to reconcile this with the available board level financial expertise, is evident from 
this quotation: 
‘With finance - I’m talking about what we experienced before the last person left, that did 
finance - he was an accountant.  So he had a business attitude, whereas a lot of us have a 
housekeeping attitude that if the money’s not there you can’t buy it that week.  You have 
to wait.  Whereas he saw an overall picture of a business and would understand, maybe, 
that it was expensive at the moment, but somehow you created the accounting and it 
would be all right long term.  But, personally, I don’t understand.  When it’s explained to 
me, I understand it, but I couldn’t give views and put in ideas, I don’t think, because I 
think on a housekeeping basis.  So I think an accountant or someone with business 
understanding can help, because he did.  He would say that it was in the deficit, say the 
half year, was within a certain acceptable amount and that we could do something by the 
end of the year.  And he would see how it could be done.  But I don’t work like that. If it’s 
not there, you don’t spend it.’      [parent governor] 
In reality, the board left all important financial matters to the Head: 
‘ I think they’re very much guided by the Head Teacher, who is obviously there on the 
day-to-day basis and he’s going to guide the governing body in the right direction, I 
think.’         [staff governor] 
At the NVO, there was the emergence of a difference between those who saw the 
organisation as mainly a development and education organisation, and those who saw it 
as an aid organisation.  Robust management accounting data about the costs and benefits 
ensuing from the different aspects of the organisation’s work could, paradoxically, both 
resolve and exacerbate these differences.  Information which could contribute to an 
objective assessment of the costs and benefits of different strategic options would be 
difficult to generate, although the board was beginning to think about ways of evaluating 
the effectiveness of different aspects of its work.  As with the College, awareness of the 
potential of strategic financial management was ahead of the practice, but that awareness 
differentiated these two cases from the School and the LVO. 
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7.4 Conclusions 
Below is a summary of the main findings on how boards contributed to financial matters, 
followed by some of the implications of these findings for practice. 
Findings 
• In all four cases the boards undertook two basic functions of financial monitoring 
openly and, essentially, adequately: routine consideration of actual income and 
expenditure against budget; routine considerations of projections of future income and 
expenditure.  
• Boards thereby act as a structure and a discipline for the financial accountability of 
public and non-profit organisations.  This accountability is rooted in a public 
reporting tradition rather than a management accounting one.  
• Boards’ roles in financial monitoring are constrained by this tradition.  If the objective 
of compliance with regulations is too dominant, it can squeeze out monitoring of 
financial information as a means of identifying trends and patterns upon which to act. 
• The existence of an audit function, perhaps but not only through the establishment of 
an Audit Committee serviced by independent internal auditors, can provide an 
effective way for boards to contribute to (i) the holding of management to account, 
(ii) continuous improvement in the efficiency and propriety of systems and 
procedures, and (iii) organisations’ exposure to practice elsewhere.  Larger 
organisations appear more able to oversee financial procedures than smaller ones, 
who lack resources, expertise and an awareness of what is possible.  
• One of the key factors in the effectiveness of boards’ contribution to financial issues 
is the financial expertise of both board members and the managers who report to 
them.  Board members with accountancy expertise, and/or senior financial 
management experience, can make a real difference to organisations’ capacity to 
define a financial role for the board, generate appropriate financial information, and 
then to understand and use it.  Conversely, where board members lack this expertise, 
managers may be required to devote a substantial amount of time simply to explaining 
financial information. Or little management or governance time may be derated, 
because of the trust in the propriety and competence of those managing the finances. 
• A second key factor is the relationship between senior managers (especially financial 
managers) and board members.  The most useful contributions occurred where 
managers welcomed challenging questions from board members and saw them as a 
resource, not where board members where seen primarily as people to explain 
financial information to. 
• A third factor is the extent of board members’ involvement in the organisation.  Board 
members who understand the essential cost structure of their organisations -whether 
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through their reading of figures or their access to the organisation’s operations - make 
more useful contributions. 
• Boards can, but generally do not, make a significant contribution to strategic financial 
management.  Involvement in the budget-setting process can feature in this 
contribution  : this can enhance the process in the organisation in terms of stakeholder 
legitimacy and of clarifying priorities and options. 
• There is little evidence that boards contribute to how effectively of their organisations 
convert resource inputs into performance outcomes.  A financial accounting tradition 
holds sway over a management accounting tradition, resulting in under-use of 
methods which could help boards to assess and develop the financial performanceof 
the organisation. 
• There was no evidence of management accountancy expertise being used to: 
- select and consider ratios which relate the consumption of resources to the quantity of 
outputs or to the quality of outcomes 
- identify what value was added at different stages of the organisations’ service 
processes, by quantifying the cost and benefit of the different activities undertaken 
- identify and compare key resource: performance ratios with comparable 
organisations; the concept of bench marking was never mentioned. 
• Whilst this lack of attention to using accounting-based approaches to performance 
evaluation was a ‘whole organisation’ issue, it is also a comment on governance in 
particular.  If boards do not demand (or cannot interpret) information about the 
relative costs and performance outcomes of major expenditure options (ex ante 
accountability), they will be limited in their capacity to demand and to question 
reports from management on the consequences of decisions made (ex poste 
accountability).  
 
Implications for Practice 
(1) Public and non-profit boards should make greater efforts to recruit and 
utilise the expertise of accountants and others with senior financial 
management experience 
Our study suggested that expertise is a critical factor in how boards contribute to financial 
issues.  This expertise may be acquired in various ways: through the selection of board 
members, the use of co-options and the appointment of advisers. Such experts can also 
have a role helping to develop the financial expertise of other board members.  There is a 
danger though that excessive reliance upon experts can disenfranchise other board 
members, and such experts need to be sensitive to the social objectives and stakeholder 
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concerns represented by other board members.  Nonetheless it is difficult to envisage a 
board effectively setting strategic financial objectives,  overseeing financial procedures 
and operations and reviewing performance without some degree of expertise available. 
(2) Boards should consider the establishment of an audit function in the 
organisation 
Whether through an Audit Committee, a contract with an internal auditor who reports to 
the board on matters which concern the board, or the shadowing of financial staff by a 
sympathetic board member with appropriate expertise, the audit function is a potentially 
significant one for boards to play.  The scale of the audit function should obviously relate 
to the size and resources of the organisation. 
(3) Management accounting approaches can be applied to enhance the boards’ 
contribution to organisational performance - and hence its achievement of 
social objectives 
The ability to analyse the relationship between resource inputs and performance outcomes 
is central to a board's capacity to assess the effectiveness of the organisation.  If finance is 
approached only from the compliance tradition of financial accounting, then the benefits 
which management accounting methods can bring will not be gained.  Methods which 
could help boards to assess and develop their financial performance include 
benchmarking, ratio analysis and value-added accounting. 
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(8) Conclusions 
For a long time issues of governance have been neglected.  In the voluntary sector and 
perhaps beyond there has been some confusion and even ignorance among many board 
members  about their responsibilities.  In the public sector rapid change has lead to new 
and varied patterns of governance emerging.  At the same time there has been a growing 
concern about the effectiveness of boards to carry out their role.  Against this background 
it is not surprising that much of the emerging body of work and literature on governance 
has been prescriptive in nature, trying to set out the responsibilities of board members and 
how they should behave.  Much valuable work has been done clarifying the role of 
governing bodies and raising awareness among board members of  their responsibilities.  
Yet there is a big gap between these prescriptions and the reality of governance revealed 
by empirical studies.  There is a danger that if these prescriptions do not adequately take 
account of the constraints and difficult dilemmas that board members face they will be 
ignored. 
In these conclusions we draw out the contribution that the different boards we observed 
made, and how these were constrained by a variety of factors.  Finally we make some 
recommendations for trying to improve practice which try to take into account some of 
the difficult dilemmas and constraints boards face. 
8.1 Do boards make a difference? 
The contribution or added value that each of the four boards made to their organisation 
varied considerably.  In two organisations, the LVO and the School, this contribution was 
fairly modest, whereas a more substantial contribution was made by the boards of the 
NVO and the College.  The nature of the contribution of each board and some of the main 
influences on this are examined below. 
 The LVO 
At the LVO the board performed three main functions: 
• It acted as a link to important stakeholders in the LVO’s environment.  As such it was 
used by the CEO as a source of information and advice about issues affecting the 
organisation. 
• It was also used occasionally by the CEO as a backstop to take decisions that might be 
difficult or controversial.  For example a problem over the pay of a particular person 
if she were to move from being paid as self-employed to taking up a staff post. 
• Finally, it performed a limited stewardship role, overseeing the work and finances of 
the organisation.  However, there was recognition that it often acted largely as 
‘rubber-stamp’ in this capacity. 
A number of factors help account for this ‘slight’ governance by the board.  Originally 
when the organisation was formed it was run as a loose collective of outside supporters 
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and staff.  When the CEO was appointed she gradually brought more structure to the 
organisation and established a management committee.  However board development has 
not been seen as a priority by the CEO, possibly because she fears a loss of control and 
the board taking over.  As a result board members remain rather isolated from one 
another with little opportunity to review or reflect on their role.  This is reinforced by a 
number of factors.  The consensual culture of the board, and the feeling that they need to 
support the CEO who is over worked, means that the board find it difficult to raise their 
doubts and concerns about the role of the board.  The fact that most board members are 
selected for their contacts and sympathy with the aims of the organisation, rather than 
their experience of boards or skills relevant to governance, means that board members 
often lack confidence and any clear understanding of how they might perform their role 
differently.  The lack of development of appropriate administrative systems as the 
organisation has grown also means that the information presented to the board is often of 
poor quality, which makes their role more difficult to perform and them dependent on the 
CEO and one dominant board member to interpret what it means. 
 The School 
• At the School both governors and senior staff saw the main role of the board as one of 
stewardship - keeping an eye on how the School was run, and a check on the power of 
the Head. 
• The board also had a more limited role in scrutinising and approving policy.  Most 
work on developing policy was done by the Head often with input from the LEA.  
Occasionally through sub-committees the governors had a more active input into 
policy formulation.  However, in general the policy and strategic agenda was set by 
Government policy and  the LEA, with the governing body reacting to external inputs.   
• The board played a representative role - bringing an element of local accountability 
and involvement.  The Head saw this as the main contribution of the governors.  
Although he also felt they made a contribution to decisions, he was hard put to 
identify many decisions where he felt that there had been real added value. 
Various factors help to explain the way the governing body has interpreted and enacted its 
role in terms of stewardship, with limited involvement in policy or strategic matters.  The 
freedom of action that Schools have for strategic choice is much more limited than that 
for voluntary organisations.  They are subject to a good deal of control and regulation 
both by central government and the local authority.  The agendas for governors meetings 
were largely composed of items suggested by the local authority and report backs from 
sub-committees.  Because the governing body had spent little time reviewing what it 
wanted its role and contribution to be it was largely reacting to external events or inputs 
from the Head.  This lack of clarity about its role also meant that there was little attempt 
to prioritise agenda items for meetings or ensure information was presented in the most 
meaningful way.  As a result board meetings mainly consisted of  limited scrutiny of  a 
long list of items.  The background and experience of most governors made it difficult to 
challenge this role.  Most governors had not served on other boards and had limited 
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management experience, and the training they received tended to focus mostly on their 
statutory duties.  As a result they had few alternative models of governance to draw upon.   
 The NVO 
• At the NVO the main role the board played was one of  stewardship.  Through the 
various sub-committees the board was able to monitor not just the financial 
performance of the organisation but various aspects of its work. 
• It was also involved in various aspects of policy-making with staff, and helping to 
plan and set priorities over the coming year.  Again much of this work was done 
through sub-committees, with the whole board involved in helping to set and agreeing 
the annual budget. 
• The board was also involved in discussions of strategy, although this was usually 
responding to initiatives by staff.  However, probably the main weakness of the board 
was that it got to drawn into operational issues, and consequently not enough time 
was spent on longer term strategic issues. 
• Some board members also saw themselves as having a representative role.  However, 
this was complex and ambiguous, because they also acknowledged that there were 
many other stakeholders such as donors, staff and partners who they were in some 
sense accountable to. 
In the NVO there was the least separation between board members and staff of all four 
organisations.  This was probably because the organisation had evolved from a system of 
collective working.  Through sub-committees, board members were involved in planning 
various aspects of the organisations work.  However, in the absence of a clear 
management structure board members tended to become engaged in short term 
operational issues as well as longer term planning and policy.  The arrival of a new co-
ordinator had challenged this state of affairs and led to a process of the board and staff 
reviewing their respective roles.  However, although there was some agreement that in 
general the board focus on policy and the staff on operational decisions, there were 
difficulties making this work.  There was a tendency for the board and sub-committee 
meetings to drift towards operational issues and spend insufficient time on broader issues 
of policy or strategy.  The main reason for this appeared to be poor management of the 
governance function - agendas for meetings were long and unstructured and did not 
identify which items were of priority for the board, too much time was spent on members 
reporting back from sub-committees, and information for the board failed to adequately 
distinguish the board level implications. 
 The College 
The board of the College was seen as playing a very positive role by both senior staff and 
governors, in particular: 
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• It was active in carrying out its stewardship role.  It carefully scrutinised and 
questioned management proposals, and had an audit committee that oversaw detailed 
investigations of the College’s financial systems and procedures. 
• The board was also beginning to play a more important role in examining how the 
performance of the College could be improved and acting with senior management as 
a driver for strategic change.  However, there was a recognition that this aspect of its 
role needed to develop further, and that in part it was hampered by the lack of 
comparative information about the performance of  the College with other similar 
organisations. 
• the board also acted as a link to some important customers and stakeholders.  
However, the board was less clear about its how to operationalise its accountability to 
the broader community. 
Key factors in the success of the College board seems to have been the selection of board 
members for their expertise and experience to contribute to the governance of the 
organisation, and a Chair and CEO who had a clear view of how they wanted the board to 
function.  However, there was a danger that bringing in mainly people with business 
experience could lead to a split between those with a business view of the College and 
those with an educational perspective, and a lack of accountability to the broader local 
community.  The board was also still hampered in developing a more strategic role by the 
information it was presented with and the lack of comparable information with other 
similar organisations. 
 Summary 
Our research suggests that boards do make a number of important contributions to the 
organisations they serve.  However, the nature of the these contributions varies and is 
influenced by a variety of factors, for example: the way the organisation is regulated; the 
history and culture of the organisation; the way board members are chosen; board 
members’ skills and experience; the relationship with senior mangers and the way the 
governance function is managed.  Below we make some recommendations for trying to 
overcome some of the difficulties many boards face and enhancing their contribution. 
8.2 Main recommendations 
 For boards and senior management 
(1) Boards need to periodically review how they can try to achieve an 
appropriate mix of skills and experience among members. 
Boards are often expected to serve both a political function representing the interests of 
the public and other stakeholders, and a managerial function as a top level of 
management.  In order to serve these functions effectively it is important boards contain 
the right mix of skills and experience.  The inclusion of members with financial, and 
particularly management accounting, expertise is encouraged, but only withint the broad 
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portfolio of skills and expertise which boards should seek.  An appropriate mix of skills 
and expertise can enable boards to match the governance roles they aspire to with the 
capacity to perform them.  At present, boards aspired roles in financial management are 
often hampered by the lack of accountancy resource available to them.  
Each of the main methods of choosing board members have their strengths and 
weaknesses.  Boards need to consider whether or not they are getting the right mix of 
members and, if not, how their methods of choosing members can be improved.  Some 
organisations are making increasing use of advertising and formal selection procedures to 
improve the pool of candidates board members can be drawn from.  Co-options and 
advisers can also be used to get a better balanced board.  As organisations grow and 
change, then the types of skills and experience required on the board is likely to change, 
so it is important that these matters are reviewed periodically. 
(4) Boards and senior management need to periodically review their respective 
roles and the contribution they make to governance in the light of the 
constraints they face. 
One of the key dilemmas that many board members face is that by law they have 
extensive responsibilities, yet they are carrying out their job in a voluntary capacity, 
which means that often they can only devote limited time to it.  As a result it is important 
for boards and senior managers to explicitly examine what functions they think that 
governance involves in their organisation and how each of the parties will contribute to 
carrying them out.  A useful question for all boards to ask periodically is ‘how do we add 
value to the organisation?’  The roles they choose to prioritise may involve stewardship, 
external relations, accountability, policy-making and strategic management.  The choice 
should take account of the values and history of the organisation, the expertise of 
members, the resource constraints they face, and the changing demands of the external 
and regulatory environment.  Often the most problematic areas concerns strategy and 
policy-making.  Because they have greater operational knowledge and time it may be 
more realistic for senior management to play the lead role in policy formulation, rather 
than pretend that this function can be performed by the board.  Regular review can help 
boards and staff to clarify their respective responsibilities, and enable boards to identify 
the areas where they can add real value to the organisation. 
(3) The Chair and CEO need to ensure that board development is continuously 
undertaken. 
Because board members are volunteers with limited time, and senior managers are busy 
people there is a tendency for board meetings to focus exclusively on the business in 
hand.  As a result issues such as member training and induction, team-building or board 
development are often over-looked, to the detriment of board performance and board - 
management relations.  In theory it is the responsibility of the Chair to ensure the 
maintenance and development of the board.  In practice the CEO is often better placed to 
ensure this happens.  Consequently board effectiveness is likely to be enhanced if Chairs 
and CEOs consider their respective responsibilities for board development and make sure 
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this remains on the board’s agenda.  Development should aim to equip Chairs and CEOs 
with skills in agenda design and management and all board members with process skills 
so as to make more effective interventions in the organisation (both within and outside of 
meetings).  
(4) Board members need to clarify with senior management what degree of 
involvement within the organisation is appropriate. 
A common dilemma for board members is that if they become too involved, they may 
interfere in operational aspect of the running of the organisation; on the other had if they 
are too detached, or only reliant on the CEO for information, they may not know whether 
or not the organisation is being well run, and be unable to carry out their stewardship role 
effectively.  We have observed a variety of ways in which organisations have sought to 
involve board members in appropriate ways, for example by establishing board sub-
committees involving  board members and staff, by linking board members with 
particular staff, by giving board members a watching brief over a particular area of the 
organisation’s work or by arranging for board members to talk with staff and service 
users. 
(5) Many Chairs and CEOs need to give a higher priority to the management of 
the governance function. 
A striking feature of two of the cases was the way that board meetings had a tendency to 
drift towards operational issues, squeezing out broader more strategic concerns.  The 
research literature suggests this is a common concern.  Three factors were important in 
this process.  In both organisations agendas for board meeting consisted of a long list of 
unstructured items.  There was no attempt to prioritise in order to distinguish items that 
were of importance from lesser items, or those that were for report from those requiring 
decisions.  As a result the boards were unclear where it would be most profitable to 
concentrate their efforts.  Secondly, boards received detailed information and reports 
from sub-committee or from managers without much effort to draw out what were the 
main implications for the board.  Thirdly, some board members or staff tended to go into 
great detail when giving report backs to the board, perhaps because they felt the need to 
justify the decisions made.  Many of these problems could have been avoided if  the Chair 
and CEO had spent more time before the meeting thinking through what were the 
important items for the board to discuss, and providing a more structured agenda and 
more direction to the meeting.(see Recommendation 3) 
(6) Boards should consider establishing a means of regularly reviewing financial 
procedures and systems. 
Three of the cases demonstrated the difficulties board members face in using their limited 
resources to review financial systems and procedures and learn from experiences in other 
organisations. The Audit Committee at the College not only performed these functions; it 
also became a resource to examine the effectiveness of different operations at the 
College.  Whether through an Audit Committee, a contract with an internal auditor who 
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reports to the board on matters which concern the board, or the shadowing of financial 
staff by a sympathetic board member with appropriate expertise, the audit function is a 
potentially significant one for boards to play.  It enables them to be stewards of 
procedures, hold management to account and to ensure efficiency and propriety in 
relation to other similar organisations.  The scale of the audit function and whether it 
would be overseen by a formal Audit Committee should obviously relate to the size and 
resources of the organisation. 
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(7) Organisations should consider making more use of management accounting 
approaches in their governance. 
The ability to analyse the relationship between resource inputs and performance outcomes 
is central to a board's capacity to assess the effectiveness of the organisation.  If finance is 
approached only from the compliance tradition of financial accounting, then the benefits 
which management accounting methods can bring will not be gained.  Board members 
and senior managers should use accountancy expertise not only for financial accounting 
purposes, but for developing means of assessing the performance of the organisation 
against its objectives, especially the effectiveness of the organisation’s conversion of 
resource inputs into performance outcomes. Management accounting skills could be 
beneficially applied in three obvious areas where governing bodies can contribute to 
organisational performance: the use of ratios which connect resource input to quantitative 
outputs and qualitative outcomes; the identification and interpretation of performance 
benchmarks with similar organisations; the breaking down of service processes such as 
costs and benefits can be evaluated at different stages. 
For the accountancy profession
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